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Global trade imbalance and domestic financial fragility are intimately
related. When a nation runs persistently massive current account deficits to
maintain global liquidity as has the United States now for decades, its cen-
tral bank effectively relinquishes exchange rate flexibility to become a de
facto central bank to the world. That in turn prevents the bank from playing
its essential credit-modulatory role at home, at least absent strict capital
controls that are difficult to administer and have long been taboo. And this
can in turn render credit-fueled asset price bubbles and busts all but impos-
sible to prevent, irrespective of the nation's regime of domestic financial
regulation. Counterpart remarks hold of nations that run persistently large
surpluses, notably China, which now faces looming financial dysfunction of
its own notwithstanding strict capital controls. If the U.S., Asian, and Euro-
pean economies are to emerge from and stay out of crisis, a new global
legal architecture that fully melds trade, monetary, and financial arrange-
Jnents, in a manner that renders the global liquidity required by global
trade no longer dependent on one national currency or permanent national
deficits, will be a sine qua non.
This article, which draws together three distinct sequences of articles
by the author on financial regulation and central banking, economic
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rebalancing, and the legal underpinnings of the world economy, retrieves
and updates J. M. Keynes's original International Clearing Union ("ICU")
plan for what ultimately became the International Monetary Fund ("IMF, "
"Fund"). Part I tells the tale of Keynes's original ICU plan as advocated at
Bretton Woods, emphasizing the plan's basic structure and motivations as
rooted in Keynes's financially oriented re-conception of monetary and what
later came to be known as "macroeconomic" theory. Part If traces recent
financial, monetary, and macroeconomic troubles to our not having adopted
something more like the Keynesian IMF. Part III proposes an updated ver-
sion of Keynes's ICU arrangement suitable for today's international trade
and financial order. In effect, it serves as a rough blueprint for a new IMF:
a Fund more like the "old" one we never gave a go, and indeed more like a
world central bank, a "Global Fed."
The article concludes by looking ahead to next steps in the direction of
fully instituting the revived Global Clearing Union plan that it proposes.
What has blocked progress until now, it suggests, might well be a tendency
to segregate thought about international trade and monetary orders, on the
one hand, from thought about domestic financial and "real" economies on
the other hand. In counseling abandonment of those misleading segrega-
tions, the article ultimately suggests we change more than one institution. It
suggests we reform a false and destructive way of thinking.
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INTRODUCTION
Global trade imbalance and domestic financial fragility are inti-
mately linked. When a nation persistently runs large current account
deficits to maintain global liquidity, as has the United States now for
decades, its central bank effectively relinquishes exchange rate flexi-
bility to become a de facto central bank to the world. That in turn
prevents the bank from playing its essential credit-modulatory role at
home, at least absent strict capital controls that are difficult to admin-
ister and have long been taboo.' And this can in turn render credit-
fueled asset price bubbles and busts all but impossible to prevent, irre-
spective of the nation's regime of domestic financial regulation. Coun-
terpart remarks hold for nations that run large surpluses, notably
I. On what I call the central bank's "essential credit-modulatory role," see discus-
sion infra Part I.B. My references to exchange rate flexibility and capital controls
allude to the so-called "impossible trinity," or "trilemma," which holds that simultane-
ously maintaining exchange rate stability, free capital mobility, and domestic mone-
tary autonomy is impossible. See, e.g., Maurice Obstfeld & Alan M. Taylor, The
Great Depression as a Watershed: International Capital Mobility Over the Long Run,
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5960, 1999) (describing the
trilemma and exploring its impact on policymakers since the nineteenth century).
One way of thinking of the claim made in this paragraph, then, is as an implicit appeal
to the trilemma within a specific context: The nation that provides global liquidity
effectively relinquishes exchange rate flexibility, meaning that it cannot enjoy both
remaining terms of the trilemma-cross-border capital mobility and domestic mone-
tary policy autonomy-at once. For more on these matters, see discussion infra Part
I.B.
Although the trilemma supports my conclusions, however, I do not rest my argu-
ment on it. There are two reasons. First, the trilemma is indirectly associated, through
the (independent) work of Robert Mundell and Marcus Fleming, with the "bastard
Keynesian" "IS-LM" analysis introduced by John Hicks in 1937. See Robert A. Mun-
dell, Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy Under Fixed and Flexible Exchange
Rates, 29 CANADIAN J. ECON. & POE.. Sci. 475 (1963); J. Marcus Fleming, Domestic
Financial Policies Under Fixed and Under Floating Exchange Rates, 9 STAFF PA-
PERS-INT'L MONETARY FUND 369 (1962); J.R. Hicks, Mr. Keynes and the "Clas-
sics"; A Suggested Interpretation, 5 ECONOMIETRICA 147 (1937) (introducing the IS-
LM interpretation of Keynes). Part 1.B repudiates the IS-LM interpretation of Keynes
as Hicks himself ultimately did. See John Hicks, IS-LM: An Explanation, 3 J. POST
KEYNESIAN ECON. 139 (1980). In so doing, it articulates a more authentically Keyne-
sian account of the link between trade imbalance and financial dysfunction. Second,
global liquidity provision as a source of exchange rate inflexibility differs in certain
respects from the more typical source associated with Mundell-Fleming-viz. a delib-
erate policy of fixed exchange rate maintenance. For a thorough treatment of the
trilemma, in respect of both its theoretical underpinnings and its empirical corrobora-
tion, see Maurice Obstfeld, Jay C. Shambaugh & Alan M. Taylor, The Trilemma in
History: Tradeoffs Among Exchange Rates, Monetary Policies, and Capital Mobility
(NBER Working Paper No. 10396, 2004). For more on Hicks, IS-LM, and Hicks's
later repudiation of the same, see infra notes 20-22, and accompanying text.
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China, which now faces looming financial dysfunction of its own not-
withstanding strict capital controls. Persistent imbalance in one
realm-currency-all but inevitably brings imbalance to connected
realms: trade and finance.
If the U.S., Asian, and European economies are to emerge from
and stay out of crisis, a new global legal architecture that fully melds
trade, monetary, and financial arrangements, in a manner that renders
the global liquidity required by global trade no longer dependent on
one national currency or permanent national deficits, will be a sine
qua non. In effect, that means an International Monetary Fund (IMF,
Fund) that serves as true complement to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) as its originator first envisaged it-that is, as a de facto world
central bank (a Global Fed) capable of both (a) gradually expanding
global liquidity to accommodate growing trade, and (b) managing a
bona fide global fiat currency into which trading nations' currencies
are convertible at regularly adjustable rates.
These claims might ring initially surprising. To be sure, it is not
uncommon for lawyers, economists, and laypeople alike to hold at
least the WTO and the two Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and
the World Bank Group (World Bank), together in thought.2 Doubtless
many among us freely associate the names of these organs in some-
thing akin to Pavlovian fashion: mention one of the three names or
their associated acronyms, and the others come quickly to mind. And
rightly so. For these three institutions jointly constitute fully comple-
mentary pillars of our legally constituted global economic order.
3
Yet most casual observers do not comprehend the details or de-
liberate design that render these institutions complementary, nor do
they understand the political, financial, monetary and macroeconomic
considerations that lay behind them. For example, although the WTO
was not founded until 1994, it was originally envisaged concurrently
2. Hereinafter "WTO," "IMF' (or "Fund"), and "World Bank," respectively.
Technically, the name "World Bank" refers solely to the International Bank for Re-
construction and Redevelopment (IBRD), which is but one of several associated sub-
institutions. But popular usage tends to treat it as naming the full institution, hence the
author shall do the same here.
3. See generally Robert Hockett, From Macro to Micro to "Mission Creep": De-
fending the IMF's Emerging Concern with the Infrastructural Prerequisites to Global
Financial Stability, 41 CoI.uM. J. TRANSNAT'I. L. 153 (2002) [hereinafter Macro to
Micro] (describing and justifying the IMF's broadening role in ensuring global finan-
cial stability); Robert Hockett, Three (Potential) Pillars of Transnational Economic
Justice: The Bretton Woods Institutions as Guarantors of Global Equal Treatment
and Market Competition, 36 METAPHILOSOPHY 93 (2005) (arguing that the IMF,
World Bank, and WTO can together provide for global economic justice).
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with the IMF and the World Bank, half a century earlier. 4 Further,
under one of the two principal blueprints from which it developed
(Keynes's "International Clearing Union" plan), the IMF was to serve
as a central-bank-like adjunct to that then-projected International
Trade Organization (ITO), its mission both (a) to afford global liquid-
ity that would not be dependent on national currencies or national def-
icits, and (b) in so doing, to prevent long-term trade imbalances and
the concomitant domestic monetary and financial dysfunctions. Fi-
nally, and relatedly, Keynes's original plan recognized a link between
global trade and domestic monetary and financial fragility that contin-
ues to elude many contemporary economists. Indeed, the word "Fund"
in "International Monetary Fund" is an obvious analogue to the word
"Reserve" in "Federal Reserve."
I hope with this article both to retrieve and to update Keynes's
original vision for the IMF.5 My motives, as already intimated, are not
antiquarian. Our current domestic and global financial and monetary
troubles are best viewed as products of our not having established the
original Keynesian Fund.
Here, then, is the plan for the presentation that follows: Part I
tells the tale of Keynes's original Clearing Union plan for what was to
become the IMF. It emphasizes the plan's basic structure and motiva-
tions, as decisively rooted in Keynes's financially oriented re-concep-
tion of what subsequently came to be known as "monetary" and
"macroeconomic" theory. It highlights in particular the Clearing
Union's projected role as an institutional lever through which trading
nations could jointly prevent stability-imperiling global imbalances in
the form of persistent trade surpluses and deficits, thereby safeguard-
ing consumer demand and employment globally as Keynes had shown
possible to manage domestically.
Part I also explains the political reasons why the United States
rejected the Keynes plan in 1944. Today, Keynes's plan would be in
4. See Macro to Micro, supra note 3, at 162. That proto-WTO was designed under
the rubric of a projected "International Trade Organization." Future references herein
to the aborted International Trade Organization employ the acronym "ITO."
5. The present paper can be viewed as a sequel to earlier works by this author:
Robert Hockett, Bailouts, Buy-Ins, and Ballyhoo, 52 CHALLIENGE, 36 (2009); Robert
Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, 87 WASH. U. L. REv. 1213 (2010) [hereinafter A
Fixer-Upper for Finance]; and Robert Hockett, Foreword: Bubbles, Busts, and
Blame: Interpreting-and Learning From?-Yet Another "Meltdown", 61 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 411 (2010). Those articles discuss the domestic sources of our recent difficul-
ties; the present piece addresses the global roots of those domestic sources them-
selves. For Keynes's early understanding of the linkage, see, for example, J. M.
KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM (1924) [hereinafter TRACT ON MONETARY
REFORM].
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the United States's short-term pecuniary and long-term "enlightened"
interest for the very reasons we originally rejected it. That in turn ren-
ders global acceptance of something like the Clearing Union plan
achievable today in a way that it was not in the past, or, perhaps, is
liable to be in the future. The United States now has both the incentive
and, for the time being at least, the influence to see such a plan
through.
6
Part II traces the world's recent financial and monetary troubles
to our failure to adopt the Keynesian IMF at Bretton Woods. In partic-
ular, building on earlier papers, 7 it models our recent spate of reces-
sion-inducing asset price bubbles and bursts as recursive collective
action problems rooted in chronic, uncontrolled, and apparently un-
controllable tendencies toward excess credit-money in the American
financial economy. 8 That oversupply in turn stems in significant part
from an excess of global credit-money. And the latter for its part is
rooted in massive and still growing industrial overcapacity and conse-
quent trade surpluses enjoyed by a small number of state actors that
act "as if' they were playing by mercantilist monetary rules even
6. As Part I explains, it is no accident that the Keynes plan was favored in 1944 by
Britain, which at war's end could anticipate net debtor status for decades to come. Nor
is it accidental that the United States, then facing net surplus status into the indefinite
future, was less enamored of that plan at the time. The United States today, by con-
trast, occupies a position much like that occupied by Britain then, with the happy
difference that there is currently no dominant transnational actor able to dictate terms
to it as the United States was able to do to Britain in 1944. 1 conclude we are faced
with a rare-and perhaps fleeting-opportunity at present: a case in which the still
dominant power is apt to find currently congenial a plan that in fact is the best plan for
all in the long term.
7. The argument builds especially on Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra
note 5, but also on Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra note 3. It can also be seen as the
latest in a series of pieces that I have devoted to designing new institutions, or recon-
figuring old ones, in the interest of rendering the global economic order more just and
sustainable. See generally Robert Hockett, From "Mission-Creep" to Gestalt-Switch:
Justice, Finance, the IFIs and Globalization's Intended Beneficiaries, 36 G:o. WASH.
INT'l L. Riv. 167 (2005); Robert Hockett, Human Persons, Human Rights, and the
Distributive Structure of Global Justice, 40 Coi UM. HUM. RTS. L. Riv. 343 (2009);
Robert Hockett, Institutional Fixes versus Fixed Institutions, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
537 (2006); Robert Hockett, Promise Against Peril: Of Power, Purpose, and Princi-
ple in International Law, 17 ILSA J. INT'I & CoMi'. L. 71 (2011); Robert Hockett,
The Limits of Their World, 90 MINN. L. RiEv. 1720 (2006) (book review); Robert
Hockett, Justice in International Trade-Liberalization: A Proposed Framework for
Analysis, CARNEGIE COUNCII (Apr. 5, 2006), http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publica
tions/articles-papers-reports/5359.html#3.
8. The term "credit-money" reflects the role of bank credit, as ultimately back-
stopped by the central banking authority-in the United States, that's the Fed-in
constituting the broader money supply. More on this infra Parts I and II.
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when so doing for legitimate reasons-reasons that a Keynesian IMF
would preempt. 9
Sustained surpluses of this sort are just what Keynes's 1940s-era
Clearing Union plan was meant both to render unnecessary and to
prevent, precisely in order to safeguard domestic control of internal
credit, monetary, and financial conditions in the interest of maintain-
ing full and stable employment and economic growth. For Keynes in
the 1930s had shown domestic credit-money control to be crucial in
the management of otherwise pathologically "bipolar" financial and,
therefore, business and employment cycles. In consequence, Part II
concludes, if WTO-facilitated cross-border trade is to remain open,
reform or supplementation of the IMF along something more like the
original Keynesian lines will be a prerequisite to its long term sus-
tainability. For such reform is prerequisite to effectiveness on the part
of domestic monetary authorities in doing what they must do to avoid
future financial manias and meltdowns: that is to maintain a modicum
of price stability not only in consumer goods markets, but in money
and investment markets as well.10
Part III sketches an updated version of Keynes's Clearing Union
arrangement suitable for today's international monetary and financial
order. In effect, it serves as rough blueprint for a new IMF, a Fund
more like the version we never gave a go. Part III also emphasizes that
something like this new IMF, though a necessary condition for future
monetary and financial stability both domestically and globally, is not
a sufficient one. For it functions solely as a crucial transnational ad-
junct to sound domestic fiscal and monetary policies pursued by state
actors.
On the other hand, Part III argues, the proposed "new/old" IMF
will suffice of itself to treat other ills, thereby yielding significant side
benefits. Conspicuous among these will be ending the ongoing and
still-growing debt dependence of some developed economies, notably
that of the United States, upon a small number of rapidly growing
9. The legitimate reasons have to do with self-insurance against capital flight of
the 1990s variety, which foreign exchange reserves-especially dollars-enable. The
illegitimate reasons have to do with the export of domestic underconsumption
problems endemic to all decentralized capitalist economies once they move past sub-
sistence level production. I elaborate on the latter infra Part I.B, and on the former
infra Part II.B. For more on the problem of overcapacity, see DANIEL ALPERT, ROB-
ERT HOCKETT & NOURIEi ROUBINI, THE WAY FORWARD: MOVING FROM THE POST-
BUBBILE, POST-BUST ECONOMY TO RENEWED GROWTH AN1D COMPETITIVENESS (2011),
available at http://newamerica.netlpublications/policy/the-way-forward.
10. Further elaboration of this necessity is found in A Fixer-Upper for Finance,
supra note 5, at 1283-86.
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state actors, notably China and the sovereign wealth funds of some of
the petroleum-exporting nations. The "new/old" IMF, then, will offer
both direct and indirect benefits, all of them significant in their own
right and all of them prerequisites to a balanced, sustainable world
economic order featuring stable growth and full employment. On that
hopeful note I conclude.
I.
THE GENERAL THEORY OF (GLOBAL) EMPLOYMENT,
INTEREST, AND MONEY-AND WHAT
TO Do ABOUT IT
It is reasonably well known that J. M. Keynes, on secondment to
the U.K. Treasury during the Second World War, had a hand in de-
signing and establishing the IMF. I What is less widely recognized is
how different Keynes's original plan for the Fund was from what ulti-
mately emerged at the Bretton Woods conference of 1944. Likewise
less known is how seamlessly continuous were Keynes's original vi-
sion of his "Clearing Union" plan for the Fund, developed in the early
1940s, and his view of the functions a nation's government and central
bank had to discharge if they would stably manage the domestic econ-
omy's endemic business and credit cycles. These gaps in popular un-
derstanding stem partly from misperceptions about what Keynes's
economic contributions actually were, and a dim comprehension of
the often conflicting aims of the United Kingdom and United States
for a postwar economic order. This Part accordingly attempts to pre-
sent an accurate picture of Keynes's Clearing Union plan and to de-
scribe the political context that compromised it.
A. "Keynesian Economics" and "Global Keynesianism": Two
Complementary Misconceptions
By a curious irony, "Keynesian economics" has proved to have
little to do with the economics of Keynes. Much the same holds of
"global Keynesianism"-that set of global economic arrangements in-
stituted primarily on the initiative of the United States and, to a lesser
extent, the United Kingdom at the close of the Second World War.
"Keynesian economics" and "global Keynesianism" do roughly mesh
inter se, however, if less than do Keynes's actual economics and
I1. See generally BENN STFn-, THE BATTII; OF BRETTON WOO)S: JOHN MAYNARD
KF;YNES, HARRY DEXTER WHITE, AND THE MAKING OF A NErw WORLD ORDFER (2013)
(recounting the centrality of the debate between Keynes and the American economist
Harry Dexter White in the development of the transnational economic institutions,
including what would become the IMF, following World War It).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
20131
LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
Clearing Union plan. This Subpart accordingly reprises the first pair as
rough complements. The next Subpart reprises the second pair as more
graceful complements.
1. "Keynesian Economics": Sticky Wages, Protracted Slumps, and
Pump-Priming
In the received telling, "Keynesian economics" is the theory of
protracted depression, unemployment, and "multiplier"-enhanced gov-
ernment "pump-priming." What causes garden variety, frictional un-
employment to lapse into longer-term slump in this story is labor
market failure.' 2 Keynes's economics, we are told by those self-de-
scribed Keynesians who incorporated the master's work into the so-
called "neoclassical synthesis," traced enduring unemployment to
"sticky" wage rates. 13 Sticky wage rates are said to have prevented
employers in Britain during the 1920s, and America during the 1930s,
from effectively addressing what otherwise would have been small-
scale, transitory contractions in consumer and investment demand by
lowering wage costs. Had employers only been able to cut wages, the
story continues, they would not have had to cut jobs. The economy
would have "bottomed out" and begun "self-correcting" at higher
levels of aggregate demand and employment than prevailed in Britain
during the 1920s and America during the 1930s, then would have
recovered. 14
12. For a contemporary account along these lines, emphasizing missing labor
search markets see, for example, ROGER E.A. FARMER, EXPECTATIONS, EMPIOYME:NT
AND PRICES (2010); ROGER E.A. FARMER, How THE ECONOMY WORKS (2010).
Farmer's work is richer than this, but it is striking how critical the labor market failure
remains to his story. For the importance of "sticky wages" to pre-Keynesian theorists,
as well as some of those who called themselves "Keynesians" see, for example, VIC-
TORIA CHICK, MACROECONOMICS A1TER KEYNES 132-57, 162-70 (1983); LANCE
TAY!LOR, MAYNARD'S REVENGE 221-54 (2010).
13. See, e.g., DON PATINKIN, MONEY, INTEREST, AND PRICES (2d ed. 1965); Franco
Modigliani, Liquidity Preference and the Theory of Interest and Money, 12
ECONOMETRICA 45, 65-67 (1944). For more on the same, see also Paul A. Samuelson,
A Brief Survey of Post-Keynesian Developments, in KEYNES'S GENERAL THEORY: A
REPORT OE THREE DECADES (Robert Leakman ed. 1964). It is Samuelson who coined
the term "neoclassical synthesis." See id.; see also PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS
(1948). A typical latter-day propagation of the myth that Keynes was all about "sticky
wages" is Paul Wells, The Aggregate Supply Curve: Keynes and Downwardly Sticky
Money Wages, 16 J. ECON. EDUC. 297, 298-300 (1985).
14. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. As we shall see, this is a strange
story to have foisted on Keynes, and not only because Keynes observed wages in fact
to have fallen during the periods in question. It is strange also because lower wages
reduce aggregate demand just as do layoffs, and it is the structure of this downward
spiral itself-which is in the nature of a recursive collective action problem-that
Keynes faulted orthodox theory for having missed. Where the classicals posited self-
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Since employers could not lower wages and thus effect this
happy landing on their own, the familiar story continues, Keynes con-
cluded that it was up to the government to stimulate aggregate demand
artificially. Government could compensate for sticky-wage-induced
slumps in demand-side expenditure by (a) spending itself, (b) lower-
ing interest rates, (c) increasing the money supply in other ways, or (d)
some combination of these. 15 The stimulative effects of such measures
would find amplification through a "multiplier effect" first identified
by Keynes's student Richard Kahn and put to good use, in modified
form, in Keynes's 1936 General Theory. 16 This would happen as re-
cipients of augmented expenditure made expenditures of their own,
the recipients of which would then make expenditures of their own,
and so on until the initial stimulus had worked its way through the
economy like new blood in an ailing body. 17 In time this would all
lead more firms to resume production and hiring again, and full health
would be restored. 18
This is the core of the familiar "pump-priming" account of what
passes for "Keynesian economics" today-the brand Keynes's student
Joan Robinson acidly dubbed "bastard Keynesianism."' 19 It dates back
to John Hicks's influential but surprisingly reductive 1937 "IS/LM"
representation of the story Keynes densely elaborated in the General
Theory.20 Through the efforts of Alvin Hansen and others at Harvard
equilibrating tendencies, Keynes found self-reinforcing feedback effects. See gener-
ally JOHN MAYNARD KiYNES, TH. Gi:NFRAI. THIORY OiF EMPI .)YMFNT, INTERE ST
AND MONEY 257-71 (1936) [hereinafter Tmu; GENFRAI. THEORY]. Ironically, Keynes
actually warned against wage-cutting in Chapter 19 of The General Theory. The ad-
vocate for wage cutting was none other than the "classical theorist" against whom
Keynes inveighed in The General Theory, Arthur Cecil Pigou. See, e.g., A.C. Pigou,
The Classical Stationary State, 53 ECON. J. 343, 349-50 (1943) (Pigou attempts to
rebut Keynes). The so-called "Pigou Effect" stemming from this work feeds into
Modigiliani, supra note 13.
15. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
16. THI GENERAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 113-31.
17. The magnitude of the multiplier is simply the reciprocal of an economy's aver-
age propensity to save. If on average eight out of every ten dollars received are spent
while the other two are saved, then the propensity to consume is four-fifths, the pro-
pensity to save is one-fifth, and the multiplier is five. If an initial recipient of $10 of
income spends $8, the recipient of this first expenditure then spends 80% of that $8,
and so on. In effect, the multiplier is the limit of the converging series I + .8 + .8(.8) +
.8(.8)(.8) + . . . , which is 5.
18. See THti GENERAI, THEORY, supra note 14, at 327.
19. See, e.g., 2 ROBERT SKID:LSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIST AS
SAVIOR, 1920-1937, at 538 (1992) [hereinafter 2 SKIDIFSKY].
20. See generally J.R. Hicks, Mr. Keynes and the "Classics": A Suggested Inter-
pretation, 5 ECONOMETRICA 147 (1937). It is hard not to attribute Hicks's adulteration
of Keynes's story to envy. See, for example, J.R. HICKS, VALIE AND CAPITAl. vi
(1940), in which he expresses consternation at Keynes's having beat him to publica-
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and M.I.T. in the United States, Hicks's Keynes emerged as the Amer-
ican Keynes from the late 1940s onward. 21 This "American Cam-
bridge" view differed markedly from that of so-called "Cambridge
school" Keynesianism, which, anchored as it was in Keynes's own
academic home, retained more of the original flavor.
22
Perhaps unsurprisingly, policymakers who followed the bastard
Keynesian line over the course of the 1960s and 1970s-when de-
fense, war, and Great Society spending unfreighted by countervailing
tax increases ensured there was no lack of aggregate demand-came
ultimately to grief. Their brand of Keynesianism yielded steadily ac-
celerating consumer price inflation, responsive Nixonian wage/price
freezes, consequent financial uncertainty and stagnation, and ulti-
mately a growing impression that something had gone badly wrong in
both theory and policy.2 3 Ironically, bastard Keynesianism led, by the
early 1980s, to the rise of politicians purporting to follow the teach-
ings of pre-Keynesian "neo-classical" and "monetarist" economists.
2 4
Some of these economists purported to be Keynesians themselves-
just "Keynesians" whose mission was to "unstick" wages rather than
to compensate for them with government stimulus.
25
Another, longer-term yield of that era was a perception by some
that Keynes's economics had been "discredited" by the inflationary
1960s and "stagflationary" 1970s. For Keynesianism was alleged to
have viewed stagnation and price inflation as non-compossibles.
26
However, inflation and stagflation are precisely the sorts of things
tion of ideas that he alleges he entertained too. It must also be said, however, that the
uncharacteristically dense prose of Keynes's own presentation likely played a role
here as well. The elegance of Hicks's simplified mathematical rendering, published
within a year of The General Theory, would have been seductive against that
backdrop.
21. See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 221-30.
22. The venerable Keynes follower Paul Davidson reports that Hicks recanted his
"bastard Keynesianism" in favor of the genuine article toward the end of his life.
PAUL DAVIDSON, THE KEYNES SOLUTION 175 (2009).
23. See TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 233-34 (describing the Friedman-Phelps model,
which purported to pin "stagflation" on Keynesian policies).
24. See id. at 251-53.
25. See generally Milton Friedman, The Lag in Effect of Monetary Policy, 69 J.
POL. ECON. 447 (1961); Milton Friedman, The Role of Monetary Policy, 58 AM.
ECON. REV. 1 (1968); Edmund Phelps, Phillips Curves, Expectations of Inflation and
Optimal Employment Over Time, 34 ECONOMICA 254 (1967); The Economy: We Are
All Keynesians Now, TIME, Dec. 31, 1965, available at http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,842353,00.html; Milton Friedman, Letter to the Editor,
Friedman and Keynes, TIME, Feb. 4, 1966, available at http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,898916-2,00.html (letter from Milton Friedman responding to
previously cited article).
26. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 12.
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Keynes himself had warned against when the United Kingdom pulled
decisively out of slump in preparing for the Second World War.2 7 As
we shall presently see, Keynes emerges in this sense to have been not
only a perceptive diagnostician of what went wrong in the United
Kingdom and United States over the decades preceding the War, but
also a prescient predictor of much that occurred later-including
today.
2. "Global Keynesianism": Sticky Exchange Rates, Debtor
Adjustment, and Hump-Lending
The received story of putatively shared British and American
plans for the postwar economic order partly complements that of
"Keynesian economics." In this case, tradition has it that the founders
of our postwar arrangements were haunted by memories of misguided
trade restrictions and competitive currency devaluations undertaken by
defacto mercantilist state actors during the 1920s and 1930s.28 "Beg-
gar thy neighbor" policies had predictably proved self-defeating: they
had wrought only contracted aggregate demand and monetary instabil-
ity as rewards by lessening the volume of trade and increasing the
frequency with which currencies were revalued in relation to one an-
other. 29 These developments in turn had intensified domestic recession
27. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNFS, How TO PAY FOR THE WAR (1940) [hereinafter
How TO PAY FOR THE WAR]; see also J.M. Keynes, The Policy of Government Stor-
age of Foodstuffs and Raw Materials, 48 ECON. J. 449, 456-60 (1938); J.M. Keynes,
Paying for the War, TIMiES (London), Nov. 14-15, 1939, reprinted in THE CotJiCT]I)
WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KE_,YNES 41-51 (Donald Moggridge ed. 1971). It is
tempting to wonder, in this connection, whether some of the worst excesses of the first
half of the last decade might have been avoided had the government employed its new
surpluses to pay down the national debt rather than to fund tax cuts to wealthy citizens
of the sort who speculate heavily on the financial markets, thereby fueling asset price
hyperinflations.
28. See STEII, supra note 1I, at 140. In a competitive currency devaluation, one
nation would act unilaterally to lower the value of its currency relative to other curren-
cies. This would simultaneously render the devaluating nation's goods less expensive
abroad and competing nations' goods more expensive at home, thereby aiding domes-
tic manufacturers and the employment prospects of domestic labor. See Jeanne
Asherman, The International Monetary Fund: A History of Compromise, 16 N.Y.U. J.
INT'l L. & Pot.. 235, 237-42 (1984) (describing events following World War I and
the calibrated response at Bretton Woods); see also Macro to Micro, supra note 3, at
165-66, 172-74. For a comprehensive history, see generally I THE INTERNATIONAI,
MONETARY FUND 1945-1965, at 1-118 (J.K. Horsefield ed. 1969).
29. Macro to Micro, supra note 3, at 162-63; see also Cooperation and Recon-
struction (1944-71), INT'l. MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/aboutlhist
coop.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (explaining that currency devaluation, trade re-
strictions, and restrictions on foreign exchange led to a self-defeating decline in world
trade).
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and political unrest into full-blown depression and social breakdown,
culminating ultimately in resentment, rivanchism, and war.30
The paramount goals of the victorious American and British
founders of our postwar economic order, the story accordingly contin-
ues, were to prevent future deadweight losses to economic growth of
the sort wrought by the trade restrictions and exchange rate instability
of the 1920s and 1930s. 31 The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) was designed to handle the trade restrictions. GATT
did so principally by first converting restrictions to tariffs, then stead-
ily reducing the latter through repeated "Rounds" of negotiation.
32
The IMF was to handle the exchange rates.33 It did so for about
twenty-five years principally by pegging all national currencies to the
dollar, while in turn keeping the dollar convertible to gold at the fixed
rate of $35 per ounce: a de facto return to the gold standard.34 The
IMF also would engage in short-term lending to enable nations to "ad-
just" their domestic economies, rather than devaluing their currencies,
to address current account deficits.35 This it would do by affording
them member-supplied tide-over financing as the troubled nation de-
flated its economy to dampen import-encouraging consumer demand,
30. See U.S. DiP'T OF STATE, I PROCEEDINGS ANI) DOCUMENTS OF UNITED NA-
TIONS MONETARY AN) FINANCIAL CONIFERENCF, BRETTON Wooos, NEW HAMPSHIRE
81 (1944) [hereinafter BRE TON WOODS PROCEEDINGS AN) DOCUMENTS] ("All of us
have seen the great economic tragedy of our time. We saw the world-wide depression
of the 1930's. We saw currency disorders develop and spread from land to land, de-
stroying the basis for international trade and international investment and even inter-
national faith. In their wake, we saw unemployment and wretchedness-idle tools,
wasted wealth. We saw their victims fall prey, in places, to demagogues and dictators.
We saw bewilderment and bitterness become the breeders of fascism, and, finally, of
war."); see also Asherman, supra note 28, at 239-40 (describing how currency ma-
nipulation became an economic weapon and how economic aggression led inevitably
to war); Macro to Micro, supra note 3, at 162-63.
31. Macro to Micro, supra note 3, at 164; see also BRi'rroN WOODS PROCEEDINGS
AN) DOCUMENTS, supra note 30, at 80-82 (expressing hope that conference partici-
pants could foster global prosperity and avoid "economic tragedy" of 1930s).
32. John H. Jackson et al., Implementing the Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of
Changing International Economic Rules, 81 MICH. L. RrV. 267, 270-71 (1982)
(describing the creation and implementation of GATT); see also Macro to Micro,
supra note 3, at 164, 178.
33. Macro to Micro, supra note 3, at 164.
34. See id. at 171-72. This had been the prevailing rate just prior to the war thanks
to the machinations of President Roosevelt. This is of course all of it not a little ironic
in light of Keynes's celebrated attacks on the gold standard during the 1920s. See,
e.g., JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, Auri Sacra Fames, in ESSAYS IN PERSUASION (1931).
35. See Sandra Blanco & Enrique Carrasco, Pursuing the Good Life: The Meaning
of Development as It Relates to the World Bank and the IMF, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROI3S. 67, 74-75 (1999) (noting that IMF was designed to allow for "ad-
justments"); see also Macro to Micro, supra note 3, at 164, 167.
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while trimming government spending and other putative short-term
causes of poor trade performance and weak currencies. 36 It should be
noted that this arrangement placed the full burden of adjustment on
deficit-running nations.37 Nations running persistent trade surpluses
had nothing to change or apologize for. 3 This attribute, like the return
to a version of the old gold standard, placed the 1944 IMF signifi-
cantly at odds with the Keynes plan and Keynes's actual economics.
The other institution established at Bretton Woods-the World
Bank 39-was, for its part, to lend on longer terms to assist war-torn
countries of Europe in rebuilding their infrastructures. 40 This mandate
was effectively sidelined by the Marshall Plan of 1947, as perceptions
grew that the ideological struggle against communism in still-destitute
Europe would require more ambitious development assistance than the
Bank could manage. 4 1 The Bank's mission thereafter accordingly
shifted to that we all know and love today: financing development in
what used to be called "Third World" nations. 42
Without apparently-intended irony, the familiar tale of "Keyne-
sian economics" and Bretton Woods just sketched has been labeled
the story of "global Keynesianism. '43 But while there is plenty that is
"global" and even "Keynesian" in this story, there is little bona fide
Keynes. Indeed the narrative hovers uncomfortably near incoherence
even on its own terms, in particular, in the tension between its
"Keynesian pump-priming" and IMF-financed "adjustment"-that is
to say, retrenchment-components.
36. Macro to Micro, supra note 3, at 186-87 (discussing the rationale behind the
requirement of conditionality).
37. Id. at 169-70.
38. Id. at 165-66.
39. Tellingly named the "International Bank for Reconstruction and Development"
(IBRD). See id. at 156; see also David D. Driscoll, The IMF and the World Bank:
How Do They Differ?, INT'L, MON1ETARY FuND, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
exrp/differ/differ.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2013).
40. Macro to Micro, supra note 3, at 163; Driscoll, supra note 39 (noting that the
World Bank is primarily responsible for financing economic development and that
"first loans were extended during the late 1940s to finance the reconstruction of the
war-ravaged economies of Western Europe").
41. See Macro to Micro, supra note 3, at 163.
42. See Driscoll, supra note 39 (noting that initial recipients of World Bank loans
were Western European countries but "the Bank turned its attention to assisting the
world's poorer nations, known as developing countries" and adding that Bank now
lends exclusively to developing countries).
43. See, e.g., GERNOT KOHIA:R, GI.OBtAI KEYNESIANISM: UNE:QUAL EXCHANGE ANI)
GIOI3AL EXPLOITATION (2001); see also HARTMUT EI.SENHANS, STATE, CLASS AND
DEVI.r OPMENT (1996); W. R. Mead, American Economic Policy in the Antemillenial
Era, 6 WORI D Poi'y J. 385, 396 (1989).
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For reasons such as these, it would probably be more apt to label
the postwar Bretton Woods system an instance of "global bastard
Keynesianism." Unsurprisingly, this regime came to grief in the same
period-and in much the same way-that domestic "Keynesianism"
did in the United States. The system faltered when President Nixon
unilaterally suspended dollar-gold convertibility in the early 1970s to
address accelerating consumer and commodity price inflation and
growing current account deficits.44 That in turn forced the IMF to
move significantly-albeit far from completely-in the direction orig-
inally prescribed by Keynes, by allowing for more frequent currency
realignments and instituting, albeit in modest amounts, a global credit-
money known as the "Special Drawing Right" or SDR, more on which
below.45 Keynes had, in other words, proved as prescient about global
economic arrangements as he had about domestic ones.
The next task, then, is to put things to rights where the details of
Keynes's actual economics and Clearing Union plan for the IMF are
concerned. Then we will be better placed to appreciate both how
closely and deliberately integrated those two things, properly charac-
terized, were, and how a detailed grasp of this unity assists diagnosis
and cure of the world's current and interconnected trade and financial
dysfunctions.
B. Keynes's Economics and Clearing Union:
Two Complementary Reconceptions
It must be a law of some sort: Where a proper name is suffixed
by "ist," "ian," or "ism," the thing designated by the resulting word
becomes the contrary of what the bearer of the original name actually
propounded. Just as Marx had to take pains to repudiate "Marxism,"
and as the Federalists would do spit-takes could they but witness to-
day's "Federalist Society," so Keynes and his followers had to dis-
tance themselves from the self-proclaimed "Keynesians. '46 By much
44. As if intentionally to compound the irony, Nixon purportedly said "We are all
Keynesians now" after suspending gold convertibility. See Steven Pearlstein, Keynes
on Steroids, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 2008, at DI; see also Macro to Micro, supra note
3, at 172.
45. See Macro to Micro, supra note 3, at 165-66, 171-74.
46. See generally Robert Leeson, The Eclipse of the Goal of Zero Inflation, 29
HIST. oF, POL. ECON. 445 (1997) (describing American economist Alvin Hansen's
espousal of a "Keynesianism" at odds with Keynes's published writings); see also
AXEL LIFJONHUIVUD, ON KEYNSIAN ECONOMICS AND THE ECONOMICS OF KEYNES: A
STUDY IN MONETARY THEORY (1968) (an early example of a theoretician tracing the
divergence between Keynes and "Keynesianism"). For a defense of Keynes against
"Keynesianism" from the political right, see Daniel J. Mitchell, Keynes Was Wrong
on Stimulus, but the Keynesians Are Wrong on Just about Everything, CATO AT Lin-
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the very same token, Keynes and his followers had ultimately to wel-
come the results of Bretton Woods not as an institutional embodiment
of any true global Keynesianism, but as a regrettably compromised
first step in the direction whose proper endpoint-Keynes's Clearing
Union-remained quite far distant. This Subpart will first describe
Keynes's actual economic vision and then sketch his plan for a global
monetary arrangement-a plan fully rooted in that vision.
1. Keynes's Economics: Investment-Dependence, Financial
Fragility, and Countercyclical Collective Action
"Keynesianism" to the contrary notwithstanding, Keynes's eco-
nomics never was the economics of sticky-wage-induced depression.
It is, rather, an account of what makes long-term underemployment
equilibrium in a decentralized monetary economy possible. Sticky
wages do not cause long-term underemployment. Indeed if anything,
they maintain purchasing power and thereby retard recessionary slides
toward depression.
47
Instead, Keynes found recession and depression to be rooted in
other factors. These other factors, moreover, also lie at the root of
inflation and hyperinflation in consumer goods and asset price mar-
kets in Keynes's story. Keynes is, in other words, symmetrically con-
cerned with both booms and busts, which stand in symbiotic relation
to one another in Keynes's account much as do "yin" and "yang" in at
least one venerable cosmology.
What, then, is the set of factors in question, and how do they
combine to produce the boom and bust cycle? In a nutshell, Keynes's
is a story of multiple individually rational acts of decentralized eco-
nomic decision-making, which occur against a backdrop of ineluctable
uncertainty, and in consequence aggregate into recursively self-ampli-
fying, collectively self-defeating outcomes. The mentioned individual
decisions take the form that they do because they occur in the face of
ineluctable uncertainty. 48 They aggregate in self-amplifying fashion,
in turn, likewise because of that uncertainty, as complemented by
prices', hence portfolio valuations', functional dependence on decen-
tralized market behavior.
The resultant aggregation process threatens stable growth and
employment in the "real" economy, in turn, for two related reasons:
First, because self-amplifying processes are the antithesis of self-equi-
ERTY (Sept. 13, 2010, 1:14 PM), http://www.cato.org/blog/keynes-was-wrong-stimu-
lus-keynesians-are-wrong-just-about-everything.
47. See THIV GENERAI. THEORY, supra note 14, at 257-71.
48. See id. at 147-65 (discussing uncertainty).
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librating dynamics, hence stability. And second, because in this case
the disequilibrating dynamic in question occurs in an advanced econ-
omy ever prone to looming underconsumption, hence an economy in
which sustained growth and employment depend upon stable partici-
pation in investment markets-but from which market participants al-
ways are able to withdraw at will to hoard money instead.
a. Investment as Solution to Underconsumption
Keynes's economics begins with what amounts to an accounting
identity. An economy's aggregate income and aggregate output are,
effectively by definition, always equal. 49 Aggregate income, in turn,
which Keynes also calls "proceeds," can be partitioned into two basic
streams. Some proceeds are consumed, while others are saved.5 0 Now
comes a critical empirical premise in the Keynesian argument. It is a
"psychological law," Keynes asserts, that as incomes grow, consump-
tion expenditures represent a steadily declining proportion of them. 5'
As you earn more, in other words, you save not merely a growing
amount, but a growing proportion of your income. Unlike most
microeconomic propositions, moreover, this one extends without com-
positional fallacy to the macroeconomic case. 52 A growing economy
49. See id. at 63.
50. See id. at 52-65.
51. See id. at 96-98. Appeal to this "law" gives the lie to those who have some-
times faulted "Keynesian economics" for lacking "microfoundations." One who has
not fallen into this error, though he has proposed modifying the premise in keeping
with a "permanent income hypothesis," is of course Milton Friedman. See, e.g.,
MILTON FRIEDMAN, A Theoretical Framework for Monetary Analysis and Comments
on the Critics, in MILTON FRIEDMAN'S MONETARY FRAMEWORK: A DEBATE WITH His
CRITICS (Robert J. Gordon ed. 1970). It is tempting to trace Keynes's postulating this
law back to his studies under Alfred Marshall, the great English "marginalist." For it
was a commonplace of marginalism that marginal utility in consumption is diminish-
ing. If I am right about this, then we have all the more reason to view Keynes's
macroeconomics as being quite consciously possessed of microfoundations. Indeed
the latter would be more or less the same as those that underlie orthodox
macroeconomics; all that would differ would be what the two traditions built upon
them. For more on Keynes's relation to Marshall, see, for example, 1 ROBERT SKIDEL-
SKY, JOHN MAYNARi) KEYNES: HOPiEs BETRAYED 1883-1920, at 165-66 (1983).
52. Keynes viewed the macroeconomic orthodoxy of his day-though nothing went
by that name at the time-as rife with fallacies of composition. Economists had un-
reflectively generalized from the individual to the group case, necessitating Keynes's
explicit treatment of "the economy as a whole," as he called it. That perspective has of
course since come to be called "macro," as explicitly distinguished from "micro."
Below we shall find that finance, still oddly cabined off as a separate vocational,
"business school" subject by orthodox macroeconomists, is what links micro to
macro. Failures of the former's conclusions to generalize to the latter are attributable
to the former's effectively being waylaid in the financial markets, which I shall argue
are better modeled as interactive, game-theoretic phenomena than as garden variety
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is one in which savings represent a growing fraction of all income
generated by output. A corollary bears noting as well: the wealthier
members of any population consume a smaller proportion of their in-
come than do the less wealthy. Wealthy people are apt to invest, spec-
ulate, or hoard more of their earnings or winnings than are the less
wealthy. This body of doctrine, the "law of diminishing marginal pro-
pensity to consume," is the empirical starting gate for all else that
Keynes has to say.
53
Keynes took the seemingly banal observation that savings pro-
portionately rise faster than output itself and weaved a theoretical
masterpiece. Keynes showed that the increasing savings rates of grow-
ing economies paradoxically serve as a drag on growth when savings
are hoarded in the form of cash or bank balances. 54 When consump-
tion diminishes in proportion to output over time, and consumers
hoard income as cash, then rational producers and suppliers of con-
sumer goods and services are bound over time to grow increasingly
anxious. 55 They will at some point recognize that they cannot sell eve-
rything that they produce. 56 They will know that the incomes gener-
ated by production will not be spent in their entireties on the output,
and will in fact be spent in diminishing measure on it-particularly in
a monetary economy, in which income is readily hoarded in the form
of cash or bank balances.
57
If the only expenditures in a macroeconomy were on consump-
tion, then, "Say's Law" would be manifestly false in Keynes's view-
"supply" would not "create its own demand"-and producers would
know this. 58 Hence, each of them would come at some point to find it
individually rational to shed labor or lower wages, while all of their
doing so would in aggregate worsen the problem to which each was
responding: the problem of steadily worsening aggregate undercon-
representative agent, general equilibrium phenomena. See, e.g., THI; GINEiRAI THE-
ORY, supra note 14, at vii.
53. This idea represents the thrust of "The Propensity to Consume," Book IllI of The
General Theory. See THE GFNERAI. THEORY, supra note 14, at 89-131. Keynes antici-
pated this idea as early as 1923, in his Tract on Monetary Reform. TRACT ON MONE-
TARY RjAORM, supra note 5, at 18-27.
54. See, e.g., THr, GFNEIRAI THEORY, supra note 14, at 96-98.
55. See id. at 46-51, 98-106.
56. See id. at 52-65, 96-98.
57. See id. at 166-74.
58. See, e.g., id. at 26 (arguing that The General Theory of Employment fills a gap
left by Say's Law). Those who fall into the trap of finding Say persuasive appear to be
held captive by the folksy picture, beloved by 18th and 19th century economic and
political thinkers, of a primitive barter economy in which hoardable money simply
does not exist.
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sumption. Here, then, is Keynes's dilemma, which we now recognize
as a classic "collective action problem." The problem recedes only
when that gap between production and consumption is closed, when
the economy returns to subsistence-level production. If there exists
any reliable full employment equilibrium, then, presumably it is only
at a now unacceptable level of aggregate production.
b. Investment's, Hence Sustained Growth's, Vulnerability to
Radical Uncertainty and Recursive Collective
Action Problems
One might then wonder, given the looming underconsumption
problem just described, how an economy ever sustainably moves be-
yond subsistence level production. The answer is investment. In
Keynes's story, investment-expenditure on capital goods-fills the
gap that emerges between income/output and consumption expendi-
ture as an economy grows. 59 So long as investment activity remains
brisk, and savers place their savings at the disposal of entrepreneurs
who employ labor in the production of capital goods, underconsump-
tion need not loom as the self-amplifying problem schematized
above.
60
But this of course saddles the economy's investment markets
with a critical responsibility. And as Keynes is at pains to show, de-
centralization in these markets, supplemented by radical uncertainty
and the continuing availability of money-holding as an investment al-
ternative, renders them vulnerable to acutely recursive collective ac-
tion problems of their own.
6 1
The best way to elaborate this all-important role of decentralized
investment markets in the Keynesian vision, I think, will be to start
with Keynes's account of the form of uncertainty that afflicts those
markets. Then I shall proceed to the specific form of recursive collec-
tive action problem that attends decentralized investment markets fea-
turing this form of uncertainty. After that I shall attend to the critical
mediating role played by money in this recursive dynamic. The latter
role then segues smoothly into the function that Keynes envisaged for
59. See id. at 98-106.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 166-68. The effective-demand-imperiling importance of money-hold-
ing, cited above at note 54 and accompanying text, found expression not only in
Keynes's writing, but also in Silvio Gesell's. Gesell's "stamped money" proposal, in
which stamps would have to be purchased and affixed to money at regular intervals
for it to retain its value, were aimed precisely at preempting the hoarding problem. See
generally SILvio GESELL, THE NATURAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1906) (advancing the
stamped money proposal).
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what became what is called, after all, the International Monetary
Fund, which I elaborate in the next Subpart.
First, with respect to uncertainty, it is imperative to clarify pre-
cisely what Keynes had in mind. Keynes distinguished between what
we now sometimes call "radical," or "Knightian" uncertainty on the
one hand, and mere "actuarial risk" on the other.62 Actuarial risk is
associated with possible outcomes to which meaningful probability
measures can be assigned.63 Radical uncertainty afflicts possible out-
comes to which no such probability measure can be assigned.64 If we
know how many slots there are on a fair roulette wheel, and what
prizes come with each slot, we can assign a meaningful probability-
weighted value to each of the wheel's slots. Betting on a particular
such slot's catching the ball then exposes us to actuarial "risk." If, by
contrast, we are faced with a roulette-like game in which either the
number of slots or the prospective winnings associated with them are
simply unknown, we face something more like radical "uncertainty."
We do not know how to assign expected values to the prospects of
"winning" this "game." Either the assigned value, or the probability of
its being won, or both are beyond our ken. As Keynes would put it,
''our basis of knowledge . . . amounts to little and sometimes to
nothing."65
According to Keynes, entrepreneurs and investors often play a
game of roulette where nobody knows how many slots the wheel has
or what each slot's payoff might be.66 On the one hand these people
must in effect wager on the future, since they cannot know it.67 On the
other hand they typically lack principled means by which to calculate
reliable probability measures assignable to the manifold prospects
62. See JOHN MAYNARD KLYNIES, TIu-EATISE' ON PROBABITY 71-78 (1921); see
also FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, PROFIT (1921) (representing the seminal
exposition of this idea).
63. See KNIGHT, supra note 62, at 119.
64. Id.
65. THI GF;NINRAI, THIORY, supra note 14, at 149-50.
66. This is the subject of the matchless Chapter 12 of The General Theory, titled
"The State of Long-Term Expectation." It is also the focus of Hyman Minsky's now
well-known interpretation of Keynes. See generally HYMAN MINSKY, JOHN MAYNARD
KI:YNES (1976). Minsky notoriously critiqued mainstream "Keynesianism" for having
dispensed entirely with Keynes's focus on radical uncertainty, tartly observing that
"Keynes without uncertainty is like Hamlet without the Prince." Id. at 55. The only
school of thought in whose name "Keynesianism" figures while proponents attend to
uncertainty is, ironically, that known as "Post-Keynesian." See Bob Hockett, What
Maynard Keynes, James Dean, and Now Richard Posner All Have in Common, DORI;
ON Law (Sept. 28, 2009, 2:09 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2009/09/what-may-
nard-keynes-james-dean-and-now.html.
67. THI, GI:NLRAL THE;ORY, supra note 14, at 161-62.
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before them. 68 Presumably, this uncertainty is why popular lore casts
investors and entrepreneurs as bold "visionaries" or "pioneers. '69
They are like ancient sea-faring merchants or Viking explorers, heroi-
cally sailing out into the unfathomable unknown. 70
Next we turn to the way that uncertainty of the kind Keynes had
in mind combines with decentralization itself to underwrite a poten-
tially recursive collective action problem in investment markets. Al-
though investors cannot hold views of the future with confidence,
Keynes observes, they must nevertheless place what effectively
amount to wagers. 7' They must, in other words, either invest in one
form or another, or refrain from investing by holding money; and,
crucially, either choice amounts to a wager. There is no other alterna-
tive; economies abhor vacuums just as "nature" is said to do.
Ordinarily, "spontaneous optimism" or "animal spirits" will im-
pel entrepreneurs to plan and pursue projects in hopes of realizing
prospective gains. 72 The same spirits will lead many individuals, fi-
nancial institutions, and other firms, which hold savings or retained
earnings, to place capital at the disposal of such entrepreneurs. In
time, even savers make capital available, after they see predecessor
investors realizing returns. As long as investors follow the "high spir-
ited," investment will proceed, people will be employed in the produc-
tion of capital goods in addition to consumer goods and services, and
underconsumption will be held at bay. 73
There is, however, a specific form of fragility at the core of this
happy picture, rooted in the precariousness of expectations in the face
of uncertainty itself. When investors fly on a wing and a prayer rather
than with firm knowledge, it takes little to deprive them of their confi-
dence and prompt them to withdraw their investments. Moreover, the
danger of such loss of confidence tends to grow steadily during a
boom. Early entrants to a boom-including the entrepreneurs and the
first waves of investors themselves-act on the basis of anticipated
68. Id. at 162. This ignorance can be "rational" when the information is too costly
to gather or analyze. It might even constitute an inherently underprovided "public
good." Alternatively, the lack of reliable actuarial measures might stem from the in-
formation's simply not being there to be had-it being, in effect, "infinitely" costly.
Indeed, entrepreneurs and front-end investors often must guess even as to what prof-
its, numerically speaking, might accrue, let alone with what probability.
69. Keynes likens investment to an expedition to the South Pole. See id. at 162.
70. The flavor is nicely captured in Pound's translation of the Anglo-Saxon poem,
The Seafarer. See EZRA POUND, The Seafarer, in PERSONAE 64 (1929). See generally
THIE SAGA OF ERIK THE RED (Riu, trans., 1979).
71. THE GENERAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 147-64.
72. Id. at 161.
73. See id. at 98.
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but ultimately unknowable "fundamentals. '74 They expect real value
to be created or added as viable ideas are conceived, then pursued, and
then realized. Later entrants to the boom, however, increasingly bet
less on the basis of perceived fundamentals, and more on the mere
prospect that asset prices will rise as a consequence of others' betting
on fundamentals, or on others' betting on others' betting on funda-
mentals,... and so on.
75
In other words, at some point another self-amplifying process-
in this case a spontaneous "pyramid" or "Ponzi" process-kicks in
when knowledge of fundamentals is sketchy at best or radically uncer-
tain at worst. And, critically, "there need be no Ponzi or scheme in
such cases."' 76 Rather, it is yet another recursive collective action
problem.77 Asset prices effectively self-amplify as investors drive
them inexorably upward, simply by purchasing on the basis of what
turn out to be self-fulfilling expectations that other investors will keep
buying.
78
When investment markets enter into a self-referential phase of
this sort, an ever-growing portion of participants enter not so much to
"invest" on the basis of fundamentals, as to "speculate" on the basis of
anticipated price movements. That in turn leads to more borrowing.
Investors "leg the spread"; they effectively arbitrage between interest
74. "Fundamentals" are determinants of value that can be expected to be in play for
some appreciable period of time. They are typically-and in some cases controver-
sially-contrasted with more fleeting, "artificial" determinants of market valuation
such as fads, fancies, or excess-credit-induced inflationary "bubbles."
75. See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Neither Order Nor Chaos: The Legal Structure of
Sovereign Debt Workouts, 53 EMORY L.J. 657, 688 (2004) (noting that low interest
rates in the United States led to increased capital flows to emerging markets "suffi-
cient to prompt the chairman of Citibank to warn that there [was] a risk that markets
may again be moving ahead of fundamentals, as was the case in 1997 prior to the
Asian crisis") (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 5. at 1225-32 (describing self-amplify-
ing, speculative investment cycles).
77. For a description of the nature of "recursive collective action problems," see
Robert Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems, 5 J. A,. ECON. (forthcoming
2013) (manuscript at 1-6), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stractid=2239849.
78. For a more detailed description of this process see A Fixer-Upper for Finance,
supra note 5, at 1232-41. Keynes, as active a market speculator as he was an eco-
nomic theorist and policy advocate, evocatively likened this self-amplifying process
to what he observed in connection with the "beautiful baby" contests run by London
newspapers of his day. Contestants won prizes in these contests for designating as
"most beautiful" those photos of babies that ultimately received the most votes. It did
not take long, Keynes observed, for savvy contestants to shift from voting for those
babies whom they themselves found beautiful-an analogue, in effect, to "fundamen-
tal value"-to voting for those they anticipated that others would find beautiful-an
analogue to "market value." Id. at 1225-32.
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rates and current capital gains rates. 79 Lenders, for their part, grow
more willing to lend in these circumstances, demanding less exoge-
nous collateral and accepting the rapidly appreciating assets as endog-
enous collateral instead. 80 Debt increasingly fuels the bubble, and the
debt-fueling feeds into the self-amplification process. 81
A bubble cannot grow indefinitely. At some point the availability
of credit must come to an end. But for as long as a credit-fueled bub-
ble grows at capital gains rates that exceed interest rates, it is individu-
ally rational for each investor to borrow, bet, and win on the strength
of continued price rises. Collectively, this behavior hastens the arrival
of that inevitable but never precisely locatable end to available
credit.
82
In a bubble, investors engage in a game much like drag-race
"chicken," with the all-important difference that everyone earns more
as they draw closer to the cliff's side, while nobody knows just where
the cliff's side is located. The faster they drive toward that edge, how-
ever, the more likely they are to go over in the end. 83 And nothing in
decentralized investment markets prevents these races from happen-
ing. Decentralized investment markets faced with radical uncertainty,
in other words, are always inherently susceptible to self-amplified as-
set price hyperinflations.
84
Now, the sense in which these hyperinflations constitute a signif-
icant vulnerability on the part of investment markets and hence ulti-
mately the "real" economy is this: Participants in these markets
implicitly know that the party at some point must end. 85 They might
set aside those fears for lengthy periods, particularly during a boom's
earlier stages, when investment on the basis of anticipated "fundamen-
tals" remains the dominant element. 86 But gradually booms come to
be accompanied by growing anxieties-anxieties effectively propor-
tional to the mounting unsustainability of the credit-fueled bubble it-
79. Id. at 1238.
80. See id. at 1237.
81. See id. at 1238.
82. Id.
83. See Hockett, supra note 66.
84. It is curious that most who recognize the U.S. Federal Reserve's obligation to
maintain price stability, per its Article I mandate, fail to recognize asset price bubbles'
constituting hyperinflations fully as much as do consumer price hyperinflations. See
Robert Hockett, When Private Goods Themselves Are Public Goods: Credit-Money,
Central Banks, and Legal Hybridization, 14 THEORETICAL INQUIRmS IN L. - (2013)
(forthcoming symposium issue); see also Robert Hockett, What's the Fed For? Mak-
ing Sense of a Mandate (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
85. See A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 5, at 1243-44.
86. Id.
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self once Ponzi investment supplants "value" investment as the
dominant element. As such anxiety grows, Keynes observes, investors
grow more and more mindful of the precariousness of their expecta-
tions themselves. 87 They remember, in other words, that they are ulti-
mately faced with uncertainty as distinguished from actuarial risk, and
that "anything might happen" tomorrow-even a crash.
At some point, accordingly, investors grow wary of borrowing
more, hence of buying more; and lenders grow likewise wary of lend-
ing. But when this happens, the bubble stops growing, there are no
more gains to be had, and many participants now realize that as earlier
entrants cash-in to take profits, the value of their own holdings will
begin to drop. There is accordingly now a rational incentive for each
participant to aim to be early out, just as there was earlier to be early
in. The savvier participants act quickly on this incentive, just as they
did when entering at the front end of the boom. More conventional
investors, for their part, follow those leaders, again as they did when
they entered the boom. But the critical point is that it now looks ra-
tional for each participant to withdraw. "Holding" looks potentially
suicidal to the individual investor, a bit like attempting to wait out the
rush for the door in a burning theatre. And of course individual ra-
tional action on this incentive leads to collective ruin. "Runs," just like
bubbles, are the product of self-amplifying collective action problems
that afflict decentralized investment markets faced with radical
uncertainty. 88
The vulnerability of investment markets ultimately feeds back
into the "real" economy. It is not difficult to see why or how. Recall
that investment takes up the slack between consumption and produc-
tion as an economy grows past subsistence level production. Volatility
in investment markets accordingly translates ultimately into volatility
in production rates, economic growth rates, labor markets, and em-
ployment rates. Next, to see how investment volatility is transmitted to
"real" volatility, and thereby complete our summary rendition of
Keynes's story, we need only look to his account of interest and
money-the two other factors explicitly named, with employment, in
the title of his best known work.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
87. See THIE GENERAl. THEORY, supra note 14, at 132-47.
88. For a fuller explication of this idea, see A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note
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c. The Role of Money in Facilitating the Hoarding, Rather
Than Investment, of Surplus
Money plays a critical mediating role in the story, which is in
turn why it stands at the center of Keynes's plan for what ultimately
became the International Monetary Fund.
The cardinal fact about money in Keynes's economics is its sta-
tus as what I will call a residual, or more popularly, "reserve," asset.
Classical economists recognized that people hold money both for
transacting and for providing for well-defined contingencies, but
Keynes emphasizes another motive. Keynes argued that people hoard
their surplus money because they lack the confidence to lend it as
credit.89 Credit and money are in that sense two sides of a coin, if one
might be forgiven a pun. Hence the term "credit-money," often used
by followers of Keynes. 90 To "hoard" money is to withdraw credit;
and to lend or "invest" money-particularly under a fractional reserve
banking system and a central bank regime that employs quantitative
easing-is to extend credit.
Keynes's account of money hoarding prompts his departure from
orthodoxy in respect of the theory of interest. When confidence in the
future is high, Keynes observes, people and institutions are willing to
part with money at lower rental fees-interest rates-in exchange for
claims upon firms-investment securities. 91 When such confidence is
low, by contrast, people prefer to "keep options open" and thus remain
liquid by hoarding money.92 They accordingly require more in the
way of rental fees-even to the point of demanding "infinite" such
fees, by refusing to lend at all-before they will part with their
money. 93 Well before his partial follower Tobin, in other words,
Keynes cited "liquidity preference" as "behavior toward" something
akin to what Tobin would later call, in a different idiom, "risk. '94 But
in Keynes's case, as we have seen, it was anxious uncertainty rather
than actuarial risk that lay at root of the phenomenon. 95 To act on
89. See THE GENERA! THEORY, supra note 14, at 166-94. Keynes infelicitously
called this motive "speculative." Id. at 170.
90. See, e.g., JOHN WILLIAMSON, How CREDIT-MONEY SHAPES THE WORW.) ECON
OMY (1994).
91. See THE GFNERAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 166-67.
92. Id. at 167-74.
93. Id.
94. See id. For the canonical statement of Tobin's theory, see James Tobin, Liquid-
ity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk, 25 REv. ECON. STUD. 65 (1958). Unlike
Tobin, Keynes grounded liquidity preference in anxious uncertainty rather than actua-
rial risk.
95. See THr, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 160-61, 174, 208-09, 341-57.
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liquidity preference in this sense, in turn, is what Keynes labeled
"hoarding. '96 To hoard is to insist on maximal liquidity, hence to hold
off from investing.
Money, then, is what makes it possible to hoard surpluses, which
imperils growth and employment in economies that have moved be-
yond subsistence. 97 Interest rates were among the means Keynes pro-
posed to prevent money from being hoarded.
Granted, classical economists saw things differently. In the class-
ical view, lending rates were determined just as are prices of any other
goods. 98 The "goods" in this case were what the classicals called
"loanable funds," which they distinguished from money. 99 Interest
rates were determined by the intersection of supply and demand
curves for loanable funds. 100 More saving meant lower interest rates in
the classical picture because it increased the supply of loanable
funds. 0 1 In consequence, more savings always meant more invest-
ment because it meant cheaper interest. 102 Here was the source of the
classical proposition that aggregate savings and investment always
tend to equality. Investment will always close any gap that emerges
between output and consumption expenditure, rendering Malthusian
"gluts" and "underconsumption" impossible and "Say's Law" correct.
Keynes turned this picture on its head. For rather than more sav-
ings causing more investment, Keynes observed, it is actually more
accurate to say that investment effectively causes more savings. And
96. See id.
97. See id. at 174. This property of money, incidentally, is one of the reasons why
Keynes was intrigued by the "stamped money" idea earlier proposed by the "monetary
heretic" Silvio Gesell, to which he devoted several pages of The General Theory. See
id. at 353-58. Gesell's proposal was to prevent hoarding by rendering money's fungi-
bility contingent on its being periodically "stamped," with an increment of value lost
with each successive stamping. Though any such scheme would be administratively
difficult if not infeasible to implement-in partial contrast, say, to modern voucher-
style alternatives-Keynes thought the rationale that prompted the idea to be a com-
pelling one. See id. Gesell's interesting proposals, and the ideas that prompted them,
can be found in Snivro GESI ., TH NATURAL ECONOMIC ORDER: A PLAN TO SECURE
AN UNINTI.RRUIPTI) EXCHANGE 01; THE PRODUCTS Ov LABOR, FRiEi. IFROM BUREAU-
CRATIC INTERITERINCE, USURY AN) ExPiiOITATION (Phillip Pye trans., 1934). Keynes
was not the only comparatively mainstream 20th century economist to find Gesell's
proposals interesting. Others included Fisher and, a bit later, Allais. See, e.g., IRVING
FISHER, STAMP SCRIP (1933); MAURICi AiAIS, ECONOMIE i:T INTILRI" T (1947).
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by the same token, diminished investment causes diminished
savings. 103
How could this be? Well, as we have in effect already noted,
aggregate savings grow in the Keynesian story as the aggregate econ-
omy grows. °4 And the aggregate economy grows on the strength of
investment. 0 5 Investment in turn is the crediting of entrepreneurial
accounts-at least in an economy featuring fiat money rather than
specie. As long as such crediting continues, and the real economy and
incomes grow as the credited projects are realized, savings grow too.
If, however, individuals and institutions refrain from plowing their re-
turns-their savings-back into further investment, their savings lapse
into mere hoarding. Productive activity, hence growth, then will slow
down or cease. Real incomes accordingly will drop. Recession will
accelerate as investment now ceases to cover the gap between con-
sumption and output. ' 06 And the economy will slide back toward sub-
sistence level production, where all that is produced is consumed-
hence where nothing is saved.1
0 7
Everyone acting individually to save, in other words, aggregates
into yet another collectively self-defeating gesture. Followers of
Keynes called it "the paradox of thrift."' 0 8 An economy cannot in-
crease aggregate saving through multiple individual acts of money-
hoarding any more than everyone can simultaneously liquidate the
same asset at cost, or than everyone can be above average.
d. The Central Bank: A Countercyclical Collective Agent to
Solve the Recursive Collective Action Problem
The notion of a "collective action problem," like the "paradox of
thrift," has come up multiple times in this account of Keynes's eco-
nomics. It is in the nature of a collective action problem that it can
only be solved by a collective agent-an agent who acts in the name
of all interested parties. That is of course what a government is, or is
at any rate meant to be. And so here we find the core of what Keynes
took to be the essential role of government in a decentralized, finan-
cial and monetary economy that has grown past subsistence level pro-
103. See id. at 52-85.
104. See supra Part I.B.1.
105. THE GENERAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 166-94.
106. Id. at 245-54.
107. Id.
108. Paul Krugman, The Paradox of Thrift-For Real, CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL
(July 7, 2009, 8:48 AM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/07/the-paradox-
of-thrift-for-real.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
[Vol. 16:401
BRETTON WOODS 1.0
duction. 1° 9 Government's role is not simply to enforce rules of the
game in the form of contract, tort, and crime. It must also address all
of those collective action problems that render its economy subject to
dysfunction, depression, and unemployment.' 10
Where the self-amplifying collective action problem is a con-
sumer price inflation or asset price bubble, Keynes's collective agent
must render it no longer individually rational for members of the col-
lectivity to spend and thereby bid prices upward by reigning-in credit
and money system-wide. Governments can do this by selling govern-
ment debt, raising interest rates, raising reserve or capital requirements
imposed upon financial institutions (in effect, forcing hoarding), in-
creasing excises on incomes, transactions, or capital gains (in effect,
"Tobin taxation"]l'), or some combination of these.'' 2 Keynes pre-
scribed policies of this stripe in the late 1930s and early 1940s, as
Britain emerged from depression and then faced looming inflation
once war-prompted production ramped up.' '3
Where the self-amplifying collective action problem is a con-
sumer price deflation or asset price slump, the government should
render it no longer individually rational for members to hoard money
or "run" on assets or institutions.' 14 Keynesian governments do that
by loosening credit and money system-wide, and if necessary, by act-
ing as lenders, spenders, and price-defenders of last resort. 1 15 These
things they can do either by purchasing back government debt, lower-
109. See THE GENIERAI THIORY, supra note 14, at 372-84.
110. See id.
I 11. In its pure form, a Tobin tax imposes a penalty on short-term currency transac-
tions, and is designed to dissuade currency speculation. See James Tobin, A Proposal
for International Monetary Reform, 4 E. ECON. J. 153, 155 (1978) (describing how a
uniform 1% tax on currency exchange "could be overcome only by an 8 point differ-
ential" between two currencies). The term might be used more generally to suggest a
tax on other speculative forms of investing, such as "flipping" houses. See A Fixer-
Upper for Finance, supra note 5, at 1286 n.303 (describing the concept of a Tobin tax
for the housing market).
112. A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 5, at 1283-87.
113. See How TO PAY FOR THE WAR, supra note 27. It should be noted that these are
the minimal such measures Keynes thought apt to work, and that he left open the
prospect that investment might ultimately have to be "socialized" in light of the
strength of the manias to which they were subject and the comparative weakness of
monetary policy alone in combating the worst of them. See THE GINIERAj THIORY,
supra note 14, at 164.
114. See Hockett, supra note 77, (manuscript at 15-19).
115. See Anna Carabelli & Nicolo De Vecchi, Individuals, Public Institutions and
Knowledge: Hayek and Keynes, in KNOWI.FJDGE, SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE DIvl-
SION 01w LA1OR 229, 234 (Pier Luigi Porta et al. eds., 2001) ("Policies which [Keynes]
considered as remedies to uncertainty and conflict are, for instance, the management
of aggregate demand, socialization of investment, control of global saving .... ").
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ing interest rates, lowering reserve or capital requirements, decreasing
excises of various sorts, lending or spending directly, providing insur-
ance to or other guarantees on behalf of borrowers including banks
and/or other financial institutions, or some combination of these.' 16
Keynes prescribed measures of this stripe, of course, during Britain's
slump of the 1920s and early 1930s.
117
The key idea in both such cases, of course, is nicely captured by
the word "countercyclical." Keynes in effect viewed the collectivity's
ideal government, as a governor, in the engineer's sense of that word.
Just as the governor on an engine serves to keep that engine from
shaking itself to pieces through self-amplifying vibrations, or as the
flywheel on a rotating bit of machinery serves to prevent self-amplify-
ing, centripetally unbalanced movement by that part, so the Keynesian
government modulates dangerously self-amplifying upward or down-
ward aggregate expenditures in a monetary economy that features de-
centralized investment markets. As a collective agent, it addresses
those collective action problems that lie at the root of self-amplifying
boom and bust cycles, and in so doing lessens the amplitudes of the
cycles themselves. That in turn renders economic activity and growth
stably sustainable.
2. Keynes's Clearing Union: A Countercyclical Collective Agent
for the Global Economy
Keynes's designed his Clearing Union to be what I have dubbed
a "collective agent" for the world economy as a whole. It would serve
as an instrumentality of the collectivity of states rather as the state
itself serves as an instrumentality of the collectivity of its citizens, It
would prevent a global equivalent of hoarding, and act as a bona fide
transnational source of global liquidity.1 18 It would do so, moreover,
116. See, e.g., John B. Taylor, An Empirical Analysis of the Revival of Fiscal Activ-
ism in the 2000s, 49 J. ECON. LITERATURE 686, 687 (2011) (describing the "Keyne-
sian countercyclical fiscal policy" under which, for example, a decline in investment
can be offset by increasing government purchases).
117. For a good summary account, see ROBERT SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD
Ki-YNES: 1883-1946: ECONOMIST, PHII-OSOPHER, STATESMAN 405-505 (2005).
118. As we shall see infra Part II, the role of the dollar as de facto global reserve
currency conscripts the United States into supplying liquidity sufficient to keep the
world economy growing. But this means the United States must run persistent current
account deficits relative to the rest of the world, which in turn undermines U.S. and,
therefore, global financial stability. The problem for the dollar was foreseen as early
as the 1950s by Robert Triffin. See, e.g., ROBERT TRIFFIN, EUROPE AND THE MONEY
MUDDILE 9-11 (1957); ROIERT TRIEFIN, GOlD AND THE DoLLAR CRISIS: THiE FUTURE
OF CONVIERTIBLITY 145-46 (1960); Robert Triffin, National Central Banking and the
International Economy, 7 POSTWAR ECON. STUI. 46, 52-53 (1947). The general prob-
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much in the way that Keynes proposed central banks must do within
domestic economies." 19
Keynes believed that the global community would have to ad-
dress collectively what he foresaw as an ominously looming postwar
hoarding problem.120 He expected the hoarding in question to take the
form of what he and others anticipated would be very large unliqui-
dated trade surpluses enjoyed by a few nations-particularly the
United States-in relation to the rest of the world once the war
ended.121
More generally, and in the longer term, Keynes's Clearing Union
was to function as a central bank for central banks.' 22 It would act as a
countercyclical monetary and financial regulator for the world econ-
omy much as Keynes argued central banks must do in respect of their
domestic economies. It would thereby underwrite sustained global
growth and employment. And it would do these things for the global
economy using much the same means Keynes had suggested that cen-
tral banks employ in modulating domestic boom and bust cycles. It
would do so, in short, by regulating flows and quantities of global
credit-money. 
2 3
In Keynes's view, if trade between nations was once again to be
liberalized as it had been for decades prior to the First World War,
some institution's playing the credit-modulatory role globally was pre-
requisite to states' own capacities to play that necessary role domesti-
cally. 124 Since the latter in turn was prerequisite to states' capacities to
participate indefinitely in a liberalized trading order, something like
lem was foreseen by Keynes and motivated his advocacy for a global unit of account
as part of the Clearing Union Plan. See TRACT ON MONETARY RiFORM, supra note 5,
at 163-68. Another who foresaw the general problem was the post-WWI Polish Fi-
nance Minister Feliks Mlynarski. See FiIKS MI.YNARSKI, Got D AND CIFNTRA
BANKS 52-70 (1929).
119. See supra Part I.B.1.
120. See 3 ROBERT SKIDEI.SKY, JOHN MAYNARD KFrYNFS: FIGHTING FOR FRIEE)OM
1937-1946, at 205-09 (2000) [hereinafter 3 SKIDI)SKY].
121. See id; see also Macro to Micro, supra note 3, at 168. The United States had,
after all, racked up persistent trade surpluses relative to the rest of the world over the
course of the 1920s and 1930s. And as the only major economy whose infrastructure
had not been significantly harmed during the Second World War, and indeed whose
infrastructure had enormously grown during the war, it was expected-and indeed
ultimately proved-to account for over half of gross world product for years after the
war.
122. See Asherman, supra note 28, at 244 (noting that Keynes's proposed Union was
to function as "the world's central bank").
123. See id. at 246 ("[T]o prevent destabilizing speculative flows of capital, Keynes
recommended that the Clearing Union also be empowered to control capital
movements.").
124. See id.
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the Clearing Union was prerequisite to a sustained liberal trading or-
der itself in Keynes's view. 125 The only alternative would be unsus-
tainable booms and busts within domestic economies, consequent
"gaming" of global trade rules by depression-struck states facing ef-
fectively no other choice, and hence ultimate collapse of the liberal
trading order itself.126 There would be, in other words, a return to the
world of the 1930s.
127
That is the short-playing version. The best way to flesh out those
further details of the picture that are worth recalling right now, I think,
will be simply to sketch two basic structures: first, that of a readily
intuited plan that inspired the Clearing Union plan; then second, that
of the Clearing Union plan itself, which generalized the first more
basic arrangement. Proceeding in this way will aid intuitive grasp of
the connection between the Clearing Union idea on the one hand, and
underconsumption-exacerbating money-hoarding on the other. Here,
then, are both plans' basic structures, the first of which was, and the
second of which Keynes would have, erected upon the pre-existing
institutional infrastructure of cross-border transacting itself.
As for the first plan, then, I refer to the set of bilateral clearing
agreements between Germany and its key trading partners developed
by Reichsbank President Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht in the after-
math of the German hyperinflation of 1919-1923.128 The signal chal-
lenge faced by Germany in the aftermath of the First World War was
how to earn foreign exchange sufficient to pay down the substantial
reparations required of it by the victorious allies. 129 This meant that
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. Keynes had argued that the conditions of the armistice of the First World War
would lead inexorably to economic hardship and renewed hostilities. See JOHN MAY-
NARD KEYNES, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THF PEACE (1919); see also SKIDELSKY,
supra note 117, at 695. The notion that Keynes was right is a commonplace among at
least one school of historians. See, e.g., NIALL FERGUSON, THE WAR OF THE WORLD:
TWENTIITH-CENTURY CONFLICT AND THE DESCENT OF THE WEST lxxi (2007).
128. Schacht served as Germany's Minister of Economics from 1934 until 1937.
BRADLEY F. SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT AT NUREMI3ERG 11 (1977). He was ulti-
mately arrested by the Nazi regime and sent to a series of concentration camps, in-
cluding Dachau, because he was suspected of being complicit in an assassination plot
against Adolf Hitler. JOSEPH E. PERISCO, NUREMIBERG: INFAMY ON TRIAL 333-34
(1944). He was prosecuted at Nuremburg, and acquitted. SMITH, supra, at 271-82.
129. The reparations requirement was notoriously onerous, prompting Keynes to re-
sign his position with the British delegation at Versailles. Keynes famously
prophesied that the reparations, which Germany could not possibly pay even under the
rosiest of projected economic scenarios, would cripple German economic recovery
after the war, culminating in social breakdown and resumption of hostilities more
destructive than those of the First War. He publicized these views in his first widely
read monograph, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE
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Germany had to manage its trade relations quite carefully so as to
avoid current account deficits with as many trade partners as possi-
ble. 130 The solution hit upon by Schacht was to enter into bilateral
treaties pursuant to which Germany and each trading partner would
establish "clearing accounts" between their central banks.13 A sale of
goods by, say, a Czech exporter to a German importer would result in
a credit enjoyed by the former at the German Bundesbank.' 32 This
credit could subsequently be redeemed, in turn, only in the form of a
purchase of German goods. Reciprocal credits would be earned, and
spent, in Czechoslovakia by German exporters. 1 33 Czech-German
trade "cleared" in this way. Such was the scheme in its essence, if not
always in its actual operation.
34
In effect, what Schacht's arrangement did was locate a space be-
tween ordinary monetary arrangements of the sort that make persistent
trade imbalance and hoarding possible on the one hand, and hoard-
and imbalance-resistant pure barter on the other.' 35 Individual buyers
and sellers of course did not barter; they effectively employed credit-
money. But nations as wholes in the Schachtian relation effectively
bartered with one another. For no exports yielded anything hoardable,
in the Keynesian sense, to exporting nations. Instead exporters' cred-
its, rather like vouchers, were valueless unless redeemed in a narrowly
defined way-through purchase of imports from the nation whose citi-
zens had purchased the exports.
The dependence of hoarding on fully fungible money-the sense
in which it is the latter that makes the former possible, hence the sense
Pi3ACE (1919), which made him a global celebrity. The descriptions in this evocative
book both of the first modern "globalization" of 1870-1914, and of the destruction to
global order done by war and resultant economic dysfunction, ring often surprisingly
familiar.
130. See id. at 187-208.
131. See 3 SKIDEI.SKY, supra note 120, at 228-30.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. There are indications that the German government employed the scheme in a
manner that exploited its trading partners in the 1930s, which ought not surprise us in
view of the government then in power. See id. at 190, 194.
135. It bears noting, in this connection, that it is precisely the fact of money, in
Keynes's economic vision, that renders the "classical" model of an economy associ-
ated with Smith, Say, Ricardo, and their later "marginalist" followers inapplicable to
the real world. The classical model would hold good in a world in which all transac-
tions were barter transactions, for in such case hoarding would not be possible on a
grand scale. Money, however, changes everything, rendering both hoarding and, in
consequence, underemployment equilibrium possible. See supra Part I.B. I. It should
accordingly be seen as no accident, I suggest, that the scheme which caught Keynes's
attention as prototype for what became his own plan was a scheme that more or less
mimicked barter between nations.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
20131
LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
in which Keynesian "underconsumption" is critically associated with
monetary economies-is rendered particularly transparent in the
Schachtian arrangement. It should accordingly not be surprising that
Keynes grew to admire Schacht's clearing arrangements.' 36 Nor is it
surprising that Keynes would conclude that something like Schachtian
clearing might be well suited, if carefully generalized, to preventing
global hoarding after the War.1
37
Keynes improved on Schacht's system. Multilateral clearing
would boast the same virtues as bilateral clearing, while also offering
the wealth-growing efficiency potential promised by taking one addi-
tional step away from barter toward money-payment. 138 The reason is
simple: the distribution of comparative advantage in production
among countries might be such that country Alpha would do better
regularly to import more from country Beta than it exports to it, while,
say, regularly exporting more to country Gamma than it imports from
it. Meanwhile, Beta might well compensate for its persistent surpluses
vis-a-vis Alpha by running persistent deficits vis-gi-vis Gamma, which
would thereby compensate for its own persistent deficits vis-i-vis Al-
pha. And so on. Diagrammatically, with "Q" representing a given cur-
rency-denominated quantity of goods and services, we would have:
FIGURE I: MULTILATERAL CLEARING
Alpa Beta
e w
136. See Robert Skidelsky, Keynes's Road to Bretton Woods: An Essay in Interpre-
tation, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL HISTORY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: SYSTEM
AN) ANARCHY, 125, 141 (Marc Flandreau et al. eds., 2003) ("In the 1930s, Keynes
took no interest in Schacht's system of bilateral clearing agreements, which were de-
signed to free the Nazi government's rearmament program from the balance of pay-
ments constraint. It therefore comes as something of a shock to find the early pages of
volume twenty-five of the Collected Writings dealing with the origins of the Clearing
Union plan full of appreciative references to the 'Schachtian system.'").
137. See 3 SKIDELSKY, supra note 120, at 194-99.
138. See id. at 197-99.
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So long as each nation on balance imported and exported in
equal-valued amounts, then, 139 multilateral clearing would permit
more efficient exploitation of the international division of labor and
comparative advantage, while offering the same balancing benefits as
bilateral clearing. No nation would need become a persistent net
hoarder or debtor.
The key to generalizing Schacht's system of bilateral arrange-
ments, Keynes saw, would be to establish a single, central clearing
house at which all members' central banks held accounts, instead of
multiple separate bilateral clearing agreements between pairs of cen-
tral banks as in the Schachtian scheme.' 40 One might even instill
greater flexibility in such an arrangement-and provide a new source
of aggregate-demand-maintaining global liquidity as the world econ-
omy grew-by adding some form of overdraft right to clearing ac-
counts: in effect, creating a global credit-money. 14 1 Keynes exploited
both of these prospects in his own plan.
Here, then, is how Keynes fashioned his proposed International
Clearing Union, erecting a generalized Schachtian structure upon the
foundation of the then existing structure of global transacting itself. To
begin with, transactions between parties in nations with distinct cur-
rencies, of course, required currency exchanges. It required conversion
of one currency into another. 142 In the presence of cross-border capital
controls and the absence of a highly liquid foreign exchange market
free of government restriction, as was anticipated in the 1940s,' 4 3 the
currency conversion in question would be conducted bilaterally
through goods traders' banks.144 This meant that movements of goods
and currencies between trading parties resulted in changes in debits
139. In the diagram, each of the three countries imports and exports a total of 3Q.
Each accordingly enjoys balanced trade with "the world," i.e., with the other two
countries together, even while experiencing unbalanced trade with each of the other
two countries. Surplus with one offsets deficit with the other.
140. See 3 SKIDEIISKY, supra note 120, at 205-07.
141. See id.
142. This can happen in either or both of two ways. Buyers use their local banks to
convert local currencies into the sellers' currencies and then purchase from the seller;
or sellers accept buyers' national currencies and then convert them to domestic cur-
rencies via their own nations' central banks. Nothing here hinges on which route the
currency conversions take.
143. Capital controls were gradually reduced during the 1980s and 1990s, to the
point that now only a few nations, including, notably, China, continue to impose them.
See infra Part Ill. China itself has moved toward loosening its capital controls. See
Simon Rabinovich & Robert Cookson, China Unlikely to Impose "'Big Bang" Re-
forms, FIN. TIMrES (London), Feb. 23, 2012, at I (describing the Chinese central
bank's plan for a gradual loosening of capital controls).
144. See 3 SKIA-I.SKY, supra note 120, at 205-07.
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and credits on accounts held at their banks, and hence ultimately on
accounts held by those banks themselves at their home nations' cen-
tral banks. 145 The Clearing Union was simply to add a layer to this
pre-existing infrastructure by serving as an intermediary between the
central banks themselves. In effect, it would serve as a global clearing
and central bank to the national central banks. 146 It would constitute a
single situs at which nations' central banks were credited and debited,
hence the ultimate conduit through which all transnational payments
in effect flowed.
14 7
Now by dint of this "global central bank" role, the Clearing
Union would also be well situated to "create" global money in much
the same manner that central banks do within domestic economies.
And Keynes prescribed that it do just that.' 48 The Clearing Union
would discharge this function first by establishing a unit of account
into which all global currencies passing through it would effectively
be converted by denomination. 149 Keynes proposed the name
"bancor" for this unit. In effect, it would play the global reserve cur-
rency and indexing role that gold had played under the late 19th and
early 20th century gold standard.' 50 A crucial difference, however,
was that the bancor would constitute a "managed currency"-"fiat
money"-of the sort that most important national currencies had by
that point become, thanks in large part to Keynes's own decade-long
urgings, by the mid-1930s.151 Member nations then would deposit
subscriptions of their own currencies-or gold-into bancor-denomi-
nated accounts held with the Clearing Union, in prescribed amounts
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. In terms that might be familiar to some of today's international economists, a
sort of quasi-governmental "Euroclear" for the world. Other contemporary analogies
would include the Fed's Inter-Dealer Settlement Account (IDSA) system, with its
practice of debiting and crediting the securities and gold accounts of regional Federal
Reserve banks for "cross-border" flows within the U.S. monetary union; and the
"TARGET2" system within the European Monetary Union, which allows central
banks to clear and settle cross-border transactions in both current and capital account
flows. See infra Part II, for more on some of these and other contemporary payment
and transaction-clearing arrangements.
148. See 3 SKIDELSKY, supra note 120, at 205-07.
149. See id.
150. See id. See generally Macro to Micro, supra note 3.
151. Keynes had urged movement to "managed currencies" in his Tract on Monetary
Reform as well as in many polemical articles during the 1920s and 1930s. See, e.g.,
TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM, supra note 5, at 177-207; J. M. KEYNES, Auri Sacra
Fames, in ESSAYS IN PERSUASION (1931). On nations moving to managed currencies
in the late 1920s and early 1930s, see, e.g., BARRY EICHENGREEN, GOLDEN FETrERS:
THE GOLD STANDARD AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 1919-1939, at 287-389 (1996).
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keyed to their shares of cross-border trading volume. 52 In so doing
they would position themselves relative to the Clearing Union much
as domestic banks do through subscription of their nations' central
banks. 153 As run by its member central banks, the Clearing Union
would also, of course, determine currencies' relative values inter se-
using some variant of the familiar purchasing power parity yard-
stick-and hence their values relative to bancor.
154
After receipt of subscriptions, the Clearing Union also would is-
sue additional bancor by establishing overdraft facilities for all partic-
ipating central banks.' 55 These facilities would "create" bancor rather
as central banks "create" national money by "recognizing" prudent
loans made by member banks to borrowers as monetizable assets, and
by "discounting"-that is, again monetizing-commercial paper and
other evidences of debt meeting certain conditions. 56 The precise
overdraft facility of each central bank would, like its initial subscrip-
tion, be calculated by reference to the volume of its nation's cross-
border trade transactions.157 In the first draft of Keynes's plan, the
formula was one-half of the five-year moving average of the aggregate
value of imports to and exports by the nation in question. 58 Subse-
quent drafts fine-tuned the formula in various ways that are without
consequence for present purposes.' 59 The principal point is that the
quantity of Union-created bancor was tied to the quantity of trade,
rather as domestic bank-created money supplies are (or so one gener-
ally hopes) tied to the volume of domestic transactions. 60 And thus as
trade grew, so would the global bancor supply, in careful correla-
tion.' 6 1 The Clearing Union was, then, in effect to manage a globally
152. Members would be able to pay gold into the Clearing Union, but could not trade
currencies for gold. Keynes archly called it "one way convertibility," the ultimate aim
being to demonetize gold. See 3 SKIDELSKY, supra note 120, at 206.
153. The U.S. Federal Reserve, for example, is "owned" by its member banks, which
subscribe in the form of (required) deposits (the requirement part of the story account-
ing for my scare-quotes around "own"). In this sense, the Clearing Union would con-
stitute a sort of "World Fed" owned by the central banks of the nations of the world.
154. See 3 SKIDEIS:1KY, supra note 120, at 206.
155. See id.
156. For the statutory basis for the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank's authority to "create"
funds in an analogous context, see 12 U.S.C. § 372 (2006).
157. See 3 SKDEI.SKY, supra note 120 at 206; Macro to Micro, supra note 3.
158. See SKIDESI.KY, supra note 117, at 677.
159. See id.
160. See 3 SKIDIE.SKY, supra note 120 at 206-09.
161. This is of course very much in keeping with the later prescriptions of
"monetarist" followers of Keynes, notably Friedman. See, e.g., FRI)MAN, supra note
51; MII.TON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONE.TARY HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960 (1963).
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"managed currency" much as modern central banks manage domesti-
cally managed currencies of the kind that modern currencies now are.
The way in which Clearing Union accounts, including overdrafts,
functioned as a global currency can be rendered more intuitively con-
crete simply by schematizing a typical cross-border trade transaction's
effects upon Clearing Union accounts. If a British buyer were to
purchase goods from an American seller, say, the buyer would have to
purchase dollars with pounds sterling to pay for those goods. 162 These
she would purchase in Keynes's arrangement from a British bank,
which would purchase them from the Bank of England, which would
purchase them from the U.S. Federal Reserve. Through the Clearing
Union, this last transaction would take the form of credits, in bancor,
to the U.S. account held with the Union, and equally valued offsetting
debits, again in bancor, to the British account held there. The men-
tioned offset would of course constitute the "clearing" alluded to by
the Clearing Union's name.
If at some point the sum of such debits to the British account
came to exceed the credits that this account held in the form of the
United Kingdom's initial subscription and export earnings brought in
by British sellers, the Bank of England would of course enter into
overdraft with the Clearing Union. It would now be purchasing U.S.
currency or other nations' currencies on credit, just as any borrower
does. The outer limits of all available credit taking this form would be
the outer limits of the global credit-money supply itself, just as total
lending capacity within a domestic economy sets the outer limits of
the domestic credit-money supply.
Persistent overdraft of a nation's account would of course amount
to persistent net trade debtor status on the part of that nation under the
Clearing Union plan. Likewise, a persistent surplus of a nation's ac-
count, of the sort that Keynes and others anticipated the United States
would enjoy for years after the end of the world, would amount to a
persistent net trade creditor status. 163 During the 1940s, like today, a
nation's persistent trade debtor status tended to be viewed as undesir-
able, both on symbolic and on more substantial grounds. 164 Persistent
deficit seemed to suggest profligacy or decline, hence to portend fu-
ture retrenchment and sale of domestic assets-in effect, debt-depen-
162. In the alternative, she might pay in pounds and the American seller would then
convert pounds to dollars at home. Again, nothing here hinges on which route the
currency conversion takes. See supra note 142.
163. See Macro to Micro, supra note 3, at 165; see also 3 SKIDI-LSKY, supra note
120, at 210.
164. 3 SK!DIFLSKY, supra note 120, at 182-89.
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dence and peonage. Persistent surplus symmetrically seemed to
suggest virtue and ascent, hence to portend future opulence and even
hegemony. Persistent debtor status in consequence tended in the
1930s, again as today, to tempt debtor nations to raise barriers to im-
ports, to subsidize exports, or unilaterally to devalue their currencies
so as to alter their standing. The only other alternative was to de-
flate-to dampen domestic demand for all goods and services, includ-
ing imports-which of course tended to issue in politically
unsustainable unemployment and slump.
But multiple nations acting on mercantilist temptations of this
stripe during the 1930s had brought on mounting monetary and finan-
cial uncertainty, steady cross-border trade contraction, and rising
cross-national resentment during the period. 165 Keynes and more or-
thodox economists alike hoped to avoid a resumption of that state of
affairs after the war. 166 So Keynes's plans for a postwar monetary
order were in harmony with more orthodox such plans proffered by
others in respect of the exchange rate stability they prescribed.
167
Most thought that trade should be liberal, and all thought that currency
devaluations should be gradual, globally managed, and rare. Exchange
rate stability of this sort had been one-indeed the sole-feature of
the old gold standard that Keynes thought worthy of recapturing.
16 8
These commitments, however, jointly give rise to a dilemma.
For, short of discriminating against imports, discriminating in favor of
exports, or unilaterally devaluing the national currency, there seems to
be only one means for a persistent deficit nation, if acting alone, to
alter its status. It must deflate. It must dampen domestic demand
across the board and contract. And that means it must bring on domes-
tic recession of precisely the sort Keynes had shown tends to self-
amplify into wholesale depression, with no natural endpoint short of
politically unsustainable subsistence level production. Such is one of
the lessons of Part I.B.1 above.
As Keynes saw things, then, there were but two possible norma-
tive responses to this ultimately unacceptable outcome, only one of
them reasonable. One such normative response was the doctrine of
debtor adjustment favored by orthodox economists of Keynes's day
(not to mention our own), which amounted to little more than a "so be
165. See SKIoIl SKY, supra note 117, at 676-77, 698-701, 704-05.
166. See Macro to Micro, supra note 3, at 165-68 (comparing Keynes's Clearing
Union plan to Harry Dexter White's more modest alternative).
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM, supra note 5, at 163-64.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
2013]
LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
it."169 Orthodoxy, in other words, prescribed much the same medicine
for persistent trade deficits as it did for most other ailments-belt-
tightening, bullet-biting, and bleeding. Keynes proposed, by contrast,
a less deflationary and more equitable means of addressing persistent
trade imbalance.170 Thus was born the doctrine of simultaneous debtor
and creditor adjustment.
As Keynes saw things, a long-term trade imbalance between two
nations simply signaled a fundamental misalignment in the compara-
tive values of their currencies.' 7 ' The relative values of their curren-
cies were out of sync with those nations' comparative advantages of
production.17 2 Hence, not unlike even some orthodox theorists,
Keynes favored gradual, carefully managed adjustments of exchange
rates via his Clearing Union in cases of long term trade imbalance.17 3
That would amount to simultaneous adjustment on the part of both
nations, which seems warranted when trade imbalance is attributable
to fundamentals in the way that long term such imbalances seem to
be. 7 4 A short-to-medium term trade imbalance, on the other hand,
orthodox theorists tended to view as attributable to profligacy on the
part of the debtor, which the debtor was accordingly obligated to
change. 175 Keynes, by contrast, thought short-to-medium term imbal-
ance just as likely to be attributable to de facto mercantilist behavior
on the part of the surplus nation as to profligacy on the part of the
deficit nation. 1
7 6
Moreover, Keynes observed, a nation that ran long-term trade
surpluses relative to the world as a whole was particularly likely to be
engaged in de facto mercantilist practices. 177 These in turn functioned
as drags upon global growth as a whole. For persistent surpluses vis-t-
vis the world as a whole amounted to nothing other than global hoard-
ing. They were to the global accounts just what a huge, uninvested
169. See SKIDELSKY, supra note 117, at 676-77 (describing Keynes's concern that
orthodox economists would find his clearing union to be "utopian.")
170. See id.
171. That misalignment might be rooted in profligacy or poor management on the
part of one nation, but it might also be rooted in mercantilist behavior on the part of
the other nation. Or it might be rooted in no particular fault on the part of either
nation. In effect, we shall see, Keynes offered a means of simply sidestepping the





176. Such as, for example, currency manipulation of the sort we shall find some
nations to be embarked upon now. See infra Part II.
177. See infra Part II.
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bank balance or corporate retained earnings are to national ac-
counts. 178 In consequence of these observations, Keynes structured his
Clearing Union plan in a manner that placed burdens of adjustment on
persistent creditors just as fully as on persistent debtors.
179
Here is how the adjustment burdens worked under the Keynes
plan. Each member nation's overdraft rights were called its "index
quota."' 180 A nation's availing itself of these rights, of course, would
amount to a deficit relative to the world as a whole.' 18 If a nation's
central bank maintained an annual overdraft averaging more than one
quarter of its index quota under the Keynes plan, it was to be desig-
nated a "deficit bank."' 182 Deficit banks then would be permitted, in
consultation with the Clearing Union's board, to depreciate their cur-
rencies relative to the bancor-hence to the world-up to five percent
at year's end. 183 If the overdraft average in question reached one half
of the bank's index quota, the central bank in question was deemed a
"supervised bank," and was now required either to depreciate its cur-
rency relative to the bancor by five percent at year's end, or to lower
its deficit by paying-in gold. 184 Interest charges on overdrafts would
kick in as well in this case, and persistently profligate nations could be
suspended or expelled from the Clearing Union. Adjustment, then,
would be gradual in comparison to the wild fluctuations that can occur
in global foreign exchange markets under a free floating regime, while
nevertheless potentially rather more frequent than the rare "extraordi-
nary" adjustments permitted under the Bretton Woods regime from
1944 to 1971.
Paralleling the burdens placed upon persistent debtors under the
Keynes plan was a sequenced set of burdens placed upon persistent
creditors. 185 Here too the burdens were keyed to each nation's index
quota. 186 A nation's central bank that maintained persistent credit bal-
178. A provocative neo-Berle-Meansian critique of contemporary corporate law's le-
nience in respect of retained corporate earnings is RAGURAM RAJAN & LuIG ZIN-
GAILES, SAVING CAITAl ISM FROM THE CAPITAIISTS (2003); see also Robert Hockett,
What Kinds of Stock Ownership Plans Should There Be?, 92 CORNFI.i. L. Riv. 865,
897 (2007). Note that, while American household savings rates have until the recent
crisis been ominously low and even negative, retained earnings by firms have been
hefty indeed.
179. 3 SKIDELSKY, supra note 120, at 183.
180. SKIDI:; SKY, supra note 117, at 677.
181. See generally Macro to Micro, supra note 3; see also 3 SKIDEI.SKY, supra note
120.
182. 3 SKIDEISKY, supra note 120, at 231.
183. Id.
184. See SKIDELSKY, supra note 117, at 676-77.
185. See id.
186. See id.
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ances in the Clearing Union was of course running a surplus relative
to the world as a whole. It was effectively hoarding. So the Keynes
plan prescribed that an annual credit averaging more than one-fourth
of a nation's index quota would result in that nation's being "permit-
ted" to appreciate its currency relative to the bancor by up to five
percent at year's end.
187
Of course no de facto mercantilist nation would be wont to avail
itself of this "permission"-the permission here was meant simply to
provide symmetry with the debtor adjustment scheme-so the real
teeth of creditor adjustment came with the Keynes plan's additional
details. First among these was that a nation in the situation just de-
scribed would be required to pay five percent interest on its credit
balance in excess of the mentioned one-fourth of its index quota. 188 In
effect, part of the persistent surplus was to be confiscated. Next, again
in parallel to the burden scheme for net debtors, the Keynes plan re-
quired revaluation by five percent of the currency of a nation running
a surplus averaging one-half of its index quota at year's end. 189 This
nation would also be required to pay ten percent interest on any incre-
ment of surplus exceeding the mentioned fifty percent of its index
quota. 190
The idea that a nation would be required to pay interest on its
persistent surpluses is of course apt to strike the orthodox mind as
paradoxical. But the paradox here is rather less surprising when con-
sidered in conjunction with the "paradox of thrift" described in the
previous Subpart. The idea there, recall, was that widespread over-
saving actually results in a shrinking economy and, paradoxically,
therefore in aggregate savings themselves. In that sense hoarding is a
form of antisocial behavior whose penalization should not be thought
surprising.
The cardinal point in the present context is that persistent trade
surpluses, as unrecycled earnings, amount to a global counterpart to
domestic hoarding. Unlike domestic hoarding, moreover, global
hoarding is not always readily attributable to understandable caution
in the face of frightful financial uncertainty.191 It is, rather, more typi-





191. This observation does not always hold true. For example, self-insurance against
sudden capital outflows of the late 1990s variety likely accounts for some of today's
accumulation of dollar reserves by some nations. See infra Part II.
192. See generally I SKIDE! SKY, supra note 51; Macro to Micro, supra note 3.
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effectively to act in beggar-thy-neighbor fashion just as the pre-1 8th
century mercantilists had advocated; it is to play what amounts to a
zero sum game.' 93 The only difference is that today's hoarding takes
the form of foreign exchange reserves-nowadays mainly the dollar-
rather than gold.' 94 And this difference proves critical, for it not only
deprives the world economy of needed liquidity, but also effectively
forces the central bank of the nation whose currency is hoarded to
keep the domestic credit-money supply loose. That in turn limits the
central bank's capacity to act as a countercyclical modulator of the
financial markets in the manner we found necessary above. We shall
return to this in Part II in accounting for the United States's recent
financial experience.
What Keynes hoped to accomplish with the Clearing Union plan,
then, was to prevent global hoarding and the loss of domestic credit-
money control that this tended to foment, and thereby to safeguard
national control of domestic financial conditions and underwrite bal-
anced, hence sustainable, growth worldwide. 95 That would in turn
give rise to a reciprocal reinforcement dynamic between liberal global
trading arrangements on the one hand, and stable full-employment
growth along bona fide Keynesian lines within national economies on
the other.' 96 The Clearing Union would do that by facilitating orderly
currency realignments, incentivizing purchases from sellers in deficit
nations by buyers in surplus nations, and rendering hoarding transpar-
ent to all in the form of persistent surplus nations' Clearing Union
accounts themselves. 97 The regime just described embodied the par-
ticular means Keynes suggested for accomplishing these ends. He did
not, however, claim these were the only such means, nor should we.
He drafted multiple variations on the basic theme, many of them in
response to suggestions by colleagues and critics. 198 I shall adopt a
similarly flexible posture in sketching an updated template suitable to
current conditions below, in Part III.
So then what happened to the Keynes plan in the run-up to Bret-
ton Woods? I have told a fuller version of the tale elsewhere, and abler
193. See Macro to Micro, supra note 3; see also Tm GENFRAl. THEORY, supra note
14, at 303-41.
194. See generally Macro to Micro, supra note 3.
195. See id. at 165-66; see also 3 SKIDELSKY, supra note 120, at 199-209.
196. See Macro to Micro, supra note 3, at 165-74; see also 3 SKIDEI.SKY, supra note
120, at 199-209.
197. Today, this could be viewed as a list of all those things lacking in current Chi-
nese trade and currency practice. See infra Part I1.
198. See 3 SKIDELSKY, supra note 120, at 215-28, 231-32.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
2013]
LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
historians have told the story in painstaking detail.199 The short-play-
ing version I will tell here is the same in essentials but, well, short. It
is that the United States, which held by far the better part of the bar-
gaining power during the course of negotiations over the early 1940s,
could not be reconciled to the doctrine of creditor liability. 2°° Nor,
relatedly, was it willing to vest global money-creating authority in an
international organ, even one in which it would hold veto authority.
20 '
In consequence the United States proposed little more than a cur-
rency "stabilization fund" designed to "soften the landing" that would
be debtor adjustment. Specifically, the United States insisted that a
nation in deficit was obligated to decrease imports or increase exports,
and to do so in a non-discriminatory way. 20 2 A deficit nation must not,
then, raise tariffs or export subsidies.20 3 Nor could it be permitted to
devalue its currency save with global-read the United States's-ap-
proval.2 0 4 A deficit nation must instead either diminish consumption
across the board-that is, deflate-or, if need be in the long run, seek
approval from a new global institution to devalue.2 0 5 Recognizing that
these forms of adjustment work hardship, however, the United States
was prepared to support a short-term lending facility that might enable
debtors to adjust somewhat more gradually than they otherwise would
be able to do. 206 Its proposed "International Monetary Fund" was to
serve as that lending facility.
2 0 7
This facility would not be able to "create" money in any manner.
Instead it could only lend out what would already have been put in. It
would be funded, in turn, by the pooled contributions of member na-
tions, which would contribute quotas keyed not to their cross-border
trading volume, but to their gross domestic products. 20 Adjustment
loans would be extended from out of those pooled funds.2 0 9 Decision-
making in respect of such lending, for its part, would be by board
199. See generally Macro to Micro, supra note 3, at 165-74. For a more thorough
historical treatment, see 3 SKIDELSKY, supra note 120, at 173-372.
200. See generally Macro to Micro, supra note 3; see also EICHENGRF,,E-N, supra note
151, at 395-99.
201. See generally Macro to Micro, supra note 3. The veto authority, for its part, is
what the United States uniquely enjoys in the IMF.
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vote, and voting power in turn would be keyed to contributions.2 10
Consequential decisions, moreover, could only be made by
supermajority vote-specifically, by eighty-five percent or more of all
votes. 2 1 This in turn meant that one nation, as the largest contributor
by far to the fund, bore a veto.2 12 That nation was of course the United
States. It still is. The U.S. plan also meant, in effect, that the dollar
would serve as the world's de facto reserve currency-a fact which
has proved problematic, to say the least. 21 3 But we shall return to this
in Parts II and III.
Keynes and his British Treasury colleagues were unsurprisingly
convinced that the United States took the line that it did at Bretton
Woods precisely because it had been the world's largest net global
creditor for many years prior to the war, and looked poised to continue
that position long after the war.2 14 American bankers' preference for a
strong dollar, they reckoned, played a role too.2 1 5 The Americans, for
their part, appear to have suspected that Keynes's doctrine of simulta-
neous debtor and creditor adjustment had something to do with Brit-
ain's large debt to the United States incurred both before and,
especially, during the war years.2 1 6 The fact of anticipated long term
British debt, combined with what seems to have been a traditional
American suspicion of clever Britons' capacity to "pull a fast one" in
financial dealings with the rubes who were their erstwhile colonial
subjects, might have led the Americans to take Keynes's impas-
sioned-and often cleverly barbed-professions of idealism with
more than a grain of salt. In any event, the upshot was that the U.S.
delegation made few concessions to the United Kingdom during the
Bretton Woods negotiations, and the resultant IMF accordingly ended
up looking much more like White's scaled-down "Stabilization Fund"
than Keynes's Clearing Union.
217
The United States came later, of course, to find wisdom in
Keynes's earlier proposals, as its own-and its currency's-position
relative to the rest of the world grew manifestly unsustainable over the
course of the 1960s. 21 8 One upshot-Nixon's suspension of dollar/
gold convertibility in 1971-has been mentioned already. Another
210. See id. at 182.
211. See id. at 189 n. 15.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 167.
214. See SKtDEI.SKY, supra note 117, at 732-47.
215. See Macro to Micro, supra note 3, at 167.
216. See id. at 165.
217. See id. at 168.
218. See id.
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was a much scaled-down rendition of Keynes's "bancor," in the form
of so-called "special drawing rights" (SDRs), instituted by amendment
to the IMF Charter in the aftermath of Nixon's measure. 21 9 My aim in
the next Part will be to indicate why the resultant so-called "Bretton
Woods II" has proved not to be anything near enough. We shall not
have done enough until we "proceed backwards," so to speak, to the
original Bretton Woods-what I am calling "Bretton Woods 1.0."
That is something rather more like Keynes's Clearing Union Plan, or
at any rate its functional equivalent.
II.
THE WAGES OF GETTING THINGS WRONG: UNBALANCED
TRADE, FRAGILE FINANCE
The world in general and the United States in particular have
paid, and are still paying, a considerable price for not having gone the
bona fide Keynesian route after the War. This Part attributes much of
the mischief in global and domestic financial and monetary markets
over the past decade and a half to the absence of a Keynesian world
central bank.220 Focusing on the United States, it narrates the story of
the past fifteen years' financial volatility in Keynesian terms, as the
product of just that form of recursive collective action problem de-
scribed in Part I.B.I. It also documents the apparent inability of na-
tional collective agents, the U.S. Fed in particular, to modulate that
volatility under current worldwide credit conditions. It attributes this
inability in particular to persistent trade surpluses racked up by a small
number of state actors that have gone unassisted and unchecked by
any Keynesian mechanism like that described in Part I.B.2.
A. Our Latest Keynesian Boom and Bust Cycle:
The United States as Case Study
The performance of U.S. financial and real estate markets over
the past fifteen years constitutes a classic case of the boom and bust
cycle described above in Part I.B.I, rooted in the recursive collective
action problems Keynes found endemic to decentralized investment
markets. This Subpart briefly narrates that story, dividing it into three
phases. The next Subpart then examines the position occupied by the
United States and its currency in the current global trading order. I aim
to demonstrate why the IMF that Keynes envisaged, or its functional
219. See id. at 171.
220. 1 have previously made a similar argument with respect to past economic condi-
tions. See id. at 168.
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equivalent, will be necessary if we are to prevent repeat performances
of those booms and busts we've experienced over the past decade and
a half.
1. First Phase: The "Tech Stock" Bubble
In Part I.B.l I noted that self-amplifying asset price hyperinfla-
tions take root initially in exogenous developments in the "real" econ-
omy that naturally attract "fundamental value" investment. They
subsequently morph into toxic events when over-levered value inves-
tors, and, eventually, asset "flipping" investors, become the dominant
participants. In recent American financial history, two of the most
conspicuous exogenous developments at first attracting value inves-
tors were (a) the emergence and spread of distributed home and office
computing technologies in the 1980s, followed by (b) the privatization
of the World Wide Web and Internet in the early-mid 1990s. Both of
these developments led to investment bubbles and economic reces-
sions that the Fed could not mitigate alone in the absence of the sup-
port of a Keynesian global collective agent. I have discussed these
bubbles at length in a previous article and will provide a thumbnail
sketch of the arguments I have already made.
22 '
Americans were quick to recognize the revolutionary potential of
the Internet, and they invested accordingly. 222 Investment in technol-
ogy stocks, which fed investment in stocks in other sectors, resulted in
precipitous increases in the stock market's value. 223 Prospective "fun-
damental" value could justify these increases for a time. New comput-
ing and communications technologies rendered business firms more
efficient, and the firms that made this efficiency possible naturally at-
tracted capital investment.
224
In addition, credit-money was plentiful and cheap to borrow. Ag-
ing baby boomers began turning attention to retirement savings, hence
to investment options. 225 Moreover, due to a sequence of associated
stock and real estate busts that occurred first in Japan, then in Scandi-
navia, then in Pacific Rim nations over the course of the late 1980s
221. A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 5, at 1223-66.
222. See id. at 1245 ("[W]hen Netscape ... went public in mid-1995, its stock price
more than doubled in the first day.")
223. See id. at 1245-46.
224. See id. at 1246 ("Productivity grew at historically high annual rates in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s, at over 4%.").
225. See id. Changes to the U.S. tax code that incentivized investment and the re-
lated mutual fund boom provided additional incentives and ready opportunities for
retirement investing.
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and 1990s, investors with globally mobile investment capital began to
look to U.S. markets as a "safe haven.
226
As the stock bubble inflated, it was natural for investors to start
betting on future increases in asset prices, and that is precisely what
happened.227 In keeping with the Keynesian self-amplification picture,
borrowing rates also increased. 228 Investors increasingly borrowed to
purchase investment securities on margin, evidently with a view to
arbitraging the spread between interest and capital gains rates as de-
scribed in Part I.B.1. Spreads between asset prices and borrowing
costs rapidly widened, to the point that it grew steadily less plausible
to attribute stock price rises solely to fundamentals-prompted invest-
ment as distinguished from "beautiful baby" investment.
In response to such developments, a Keynes-inspired collective
agent could have stepped in to modulate market behavior. It could
have imposed higher reserve ratios or capital requirements or raised
the funds rate charged to lending institutions. It might also have tight-
ened the money supply through open market operations. Finally it
might even have ensured or recommended that higher capital gains
rates, or even "Tobin taxes," be levied on rapid turnaround sales of
speculative assets. Instead, the Fed championed financial deregulation,
kept credit-money cheap, and recommended that taxes be kept low,
which they ultimately were. Indeed, the Fed acted to reduce the inter-
est rate and actually began printing more paper money.
Beginning in March of 2000, tech stocks suddenly began falling
as rapidly as they had risen, in keeping with the model of asset price
bubbles and bursts sketched in Part I.B.1 .229 Other stocks soon fol-
lowed. Between March and May, the NASDAQ lost 47% of its
value.230 Other indexes began dropping too as the year wore on. In the
first days of 2001, the S&P 500 dropped ten percent. 231 Attempts to
resuscitate the stock markets by lowering the lending rate proved fu-
tile, and investors looked to real estate as a source of renewed eco-
nomic growth. 232
226. See id. at 1217 n.7.
227. See id. at 1246-47.
228. See id. at 1250-51.
229. See id. at 1253.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1253-54. Chairman Greenspan publicly admitted before Congress that
growing real estate prices would compensate for the decline in stock prices. See id. at
1258.
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2. Second Phase: The Real Estate Bubble
As the equity bubble inflated over the late 1990s, spillover mar-
ket-valued wealth spread to the real estate markets, increasing real es-
tate prices. 233 At first, "fundamentals" could justify these increases.
Land is, of course, in finite supply, and the U.S. population continued
to grow. Ricardian marginal land rent theory combined with Malthu-
sian population growth theory in public perception to make real estate
seem a sure thing. 234 In the long run, real estate prices could only go
up.
There were other reasons at first to attribute real estate price rises
to "fundamentals." New home-finance instruments, techniques, and
institutions, for example, originally pioneered by the then new Home
Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), Federal Housing Authority (FHA)
and Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) during the
late Hoover and early Roosevelt years, then further developed by un-
regulated private "mortgage banks" and associated industries, along
with investment banks, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, repre-
sented bona fide value-adding technological advances. 235 For finance
is a technology just as are computing and communications technolo-
gies, particularly when it makes use of the latter.
As long-term interest rates declined and the money supply grew
during the later 1990s financial firms began to develop and market
more and more new debt products by which to capitalize on the
trend.236 And at first they could do so with legitimate reason to sup-
pose they were facilitating bona fide value investment. Some of these
financial innovations, moreover, helped to add real purchasing power
to home-owning consumers, hence to boost aggregate demand in an
economy where real wages had languished close to stagnant for nearly
two decades. The refinance, for example, helped convert home-value
growth into liquid purchasing power.237 However, many of these
products attracted low-income home buyers into highly levered-and
233. Id. at 1254. Total mortgage debt had increased by fifty percent between 1995
and 2000.
234. Id. at 1239.
235. See Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, 79 S. CAI.
L. Risv. 45, 104-20 (2006) (discussing the development of residential real estate fi-
nance in the United States).
236. See A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 5, at 1254-55.
237. Id.
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risky-transactions. 238 As long as home prices continued to increase,
this increasing of leverage seemed like a rational strategy.239
The collective action problem schematized in Part I.B.1, in other
words, afflicted the real estate market. It became increasingly plausi-
ble for each individual to believe she might "refi" her mortgage before
higher rates kicked in, on the strength of the ballooning real estate
prices. 240 Lenders made similar considerations. Against such a back-
drop, it could even look individually irrational not to join the party.
Chairman Greenspan himself, apparently forgetting his role as a col-
lective agent, said that whatever ills had been caused by the debt that
had been accumulated, people are still better off.241
To make matters worse, the development of mortgage-backed se-
curities (MBS), which granted cash flow rights to certain tranches of
mortgage debt, caused an increase in the demand for new mortgage
borrowers. 242 These three trends led to a Keynesian bubble, as de-
scribed in Part I.B. By 2005, fully forty percent of U.S. home
purchases were investment purchases, bought with the intention of re-
sale-a remarkable rate.243 That fact showed up in another telling pair
of numbers: whereas in 1990, there was a total of $3.8 trillion in out-
standing mortgage debt in the United States, in the two years from
2003 to 2005 mortgage debt grew by nearly that amount. 244
So-called subprime loans-loans to people with poor credit his-
tories, unreliable incomes, or both-were a response first to the hous-
ing market's move into this "feedback loop" phase. They grew
especially popular as the market showed signs of nearing saturation by
about 2003.245 Subprime lending volume was $145 billion in 2001.246
238. See CHARILEs R. MORRIS, THE Two TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN: EASY
MONEY, HIGH Roi.ERS AND THE GREAT CREDIT CRASH 67 (2008). A common exam-
ple of this type of product is the Adjustable Rate Mortgage, which offers a low
"teaser" interest rate only to later "balloon" to a much higher rate. See A Fixer-Upper
for Finance, supra note 5, at 1255.
239. See A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 5, at 1255.
240. Id.
241. See, e.g., Greenspan Says Personal Debt is Mitigated by Housing Value, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004, at C11.
242. See A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 5, at 1255-56.
243. See WIllIAM A. FLECKENSTEIN & FREDERICK SHEEHAN, GREENSPAN'S BUo-
BILES: THE AGE OE IGNORANCE AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE 158 (2008).
244. See id. Much as he had done in response to the stock market bubble, Robert
Shiller worried aloud about housing prices. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL
EXUBERANCE 52 (2000); Robert J. Shiller, Moral Hazard in Home Equity Conversion,
7 REAL. ESTATE ECON. 1 (2000); Robert J. Shiller & Allan N. Weiss, Home Equity
Insurance, 19 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & EcON. 21 (1999).
245. See FLECKENSTEIN & SHEEHAN, supra note 243, at 158; MORRIS, supra note
238, at 69.
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It was over $625 billion in 2005, and accounted for over twenty per-
cent of home lending in the years 2004-06.247 The comparable figure
for 1997 was less than three percent. 248 Over a third of the subprime
loans extended in 2004-06, moreover, were for one-hundred percent
or more of home value-in effect, an infinite leverage rate.
249
Ordinarily, lending on these terms is not thought prudent. Nor is
such borrowing. But when prices are growing at double-digit rates,
borrowers and lenders not unreasonably assume refinancing on the ba-
sis of growing collateral values will be available.250 Add in the fact
that the two largest mortgage securitizers, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, had missions dating back to the 1930s to boost home-ownership
rates,251 and it is scarcely surprising that so much risky lending and
borrowing occurred in the early 2000s-at least for as long as the
credit-money was cheap.
The problem, however, was that the growth was now being fu-
eled not by any underlying growth in "fundamental" value, but by an
unsustainable positive feedback loop. It was Ponzi growth.
As leveraged home purchasing drove housing prices higher, those
who by borrowing were doing the driving grew increasingly exposed.
Were home prices to cease growing, refinancing on the strength of
appreciating collateral would cease to be available, "balloon" rates
would finally kick in, and people would find themselves "under
water." Were that to happen, the debt "overhang" would leave lenders
exposed too. The same, of course, would happen to those whom lend-
ers in turn owed obligations-investors, for example.
3. Final Phase: Global Contagion, Again
Housing prices reached their inflection point by mid-to-late 2006
because there were no more people willing to enter the real estate
market.252 Prices leveled off, then began rapidly to decline.253 Those
who had borrowed on terms only sustainable while prices continued to
rise now found themselves pinched. As balloon mortgage rates began
to inflate, low-end borrowers began to default. 254 That of course began
246. MORRIS, supra note 238, at 70.
247. A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 5, at 1257.
248. Id.
249. MoRI s, supra note 238, at 69.
250. A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 5, at 1257.
251. Id. at 1275-76.
252. Id.
253. See MORRIS, supra note 238, at 70-72.
254. See id. (recounting the story of Edward Jordan, low-income borrower whose
home was put at risk of loss through default).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
20131
LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
lowering the market values of mortgage-backed securities.2 55 And that
in turn issued in calls upon credit default swappers and other de facto
insurers to make counterparties whole.
Over $350 billion worth of subprime and other low grade home
loans that closed in 2005 and 2006 "reset" in 2007 and 2008. Their
monthly payments began to balloon. 256 Foreclosure rates rapidly
mounted in consequence.2 57 Talk of a "subprime crisis" grew wide-
spread by summer of 2007.258 Lenders, then holders of repayment
rights, began feeling the pinch. All of the highest profile financial in-
stitution defaults and bailouts, commencing with Countrywide itself in
2007, on through Bear Steams, Fannie and Freddie, Lehman Brothers,
AIG, Washington Mutual, and others in 2008 and 2009, stemmed di-
rectly from the collapse of home prices and consequent mortgage de-
faults. 259 So, of course, did the dramatic loss of capitalization on the
securities markets over the course of 2008 and much of 2009.
Other nations too-notably the United Kingdom, Australia, and
Spain-went through real estate bubbles and bursts of their own dur-
ing the years just described, and like the United States are continuing
to deal with the fallout-Spain especially. 260 Moreover, MBSs and
derivative arrangements tied to mortgage values had spread over the
globe. It was far from American investors alone who bet on continued
growth in American and other mortgage markets; many were global
investors who had sought an alternative to the economies of Scandina-
via, East Asia, and South America that had crashed in response to
asset price bubbles of their own over the 1990s and early 2000s. It is
thus readily appreciated why the credit crisis of 2008-10 was, from
the start, global in nature. And that is before we consider the role that
contracting credit and plummeting consumer confidence play in low-
ering global demand for consumer goods and services. Scarce wonder,
then, that the IMF reported, in 2009, the first worldwide economic
contraction since the 1940s. 261
Was the Fed asleep at the switch? Worse yet, was it in the grip of
mistaken understandings either of its own proper role or of the nature
255. See id.




260. See id. at 67.
261. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: CRISIS & RECOV-
ERY XVi (2009) [hereinafter IMF WORuD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK], available at http:H
www.imf.orglextemal/pubslftlweo/2009/0l/pdf/text.pdf (predicting a downturn in
global activity which will likely lead to the deepest recession since World War II).
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of asset price bubbles and bursts as described in Part I? In previous
articles, I suggest that this might in part be the case. 262 Yet, here, I
shall argue that the Fed had little freedom to act, owing to the United
States's role in the global economy. To that missing piece of the puz-
zle, then, we now turn.
B. The Role of Our Missing Global Keynesian Modulator:
The U.S. as Buffer and World Central Banker
In the tale just told, it seems clear that the Fed did not so much as
attempt to act as a Keynesian countercyclical regulator to rein-in
cheap credit-money or otherwise dampen credit-fueled asset price in-
flation. Some believe that this owes to misguided Fed policy, or, relat-
edly, to the role of a misguided ideologue who served as Fed Chair.
263
I don't wish to rule out those prospects. I do wish, however, to argue
that the Fed might in any event have had little choice, such that no
imputation of irresponsibility or idiocy at the Fed is necessary to ac-
count for events.
264
This Subpart argues that, whether or not the Fed tugged at the
bonds, its hands were at any rate by and large tied. It was the United
States's global trade position, as partly determined by the role of its
currency in the world's economy, that tied them. A functional
equivalent of the Keynesian Clearing Union, suitable to today's mar-
kets, would put an end to the problem irrespective of which of these
causes is dominant.
1. Trade Surpluses as Hoarding, Trade Deficits as Disinvestment
The way in which protracted trade deficits tie the hands of central
banks, forcing them to keep monetary policy loose, is readily appreci-
ated against the backdrop of Keynes's economics and Clearing Union
plan outlined in Part I.B. The first thing to note is that, where the
maintenance of aggregate demand is concerned, exports on the part of
any nation's producers act as a substitute for domestic investment ex-
penditure. When domestic consumer expenditure wanes as a propor-
tion of output proceeds per the Keynesian story told earlier, in other
262. See generally A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 5.
263. See, e.g., FIICKI:NSTIIN & SHEEHAN, supra note 243; JOHN B. TAYI.OR, GI;T-
TING OFF TRACK: How GOVIERNMENT AcTIONS AND INTERVENTIONS CAUSED, PRO-
I-ONGII) AND WORSINI THE FINANCIAl. CRISIS (2009).
264. 1 argue on behalf of such a "charitable interpretation" at greater length in Robert
Hockett, Bubbles, Busts, and Blame (Cornell L. Sch. Research Paper No. 11-09,
2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRNID 1805930_code
1215500.pdPabstractid= I 805930&mirid= 1.
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words, exports offer an additional means of filling the gap. Dimin-
ished proportional domestic consumption expenditure now can be sup-
plemented, not only by domestic investment expenditure, but also by
foreign expenditure on domestic products. Exports might accordingly
be categorized as investment, in functional Keynesian terms. Exports
discharge the same demand-supplementary function, and stave off the
underconsumption threat faced by any advanced economy.
It follows, from the role played by exports, that imports function
as disinvestment where underconsumption is concerned. That is to say,
they aggravate the gulf that opens between domestic production and
domestic consumption as an advanced economy moves past subsis-
tence level production. For domestic producers now confront looming
underconsumption of their offerings not only in the domestic popula-
tion's diminishing marginal propensity to consume, but also in compe-
tition from foreign producers for what consumer demand there
remains. In short, then, if a nation persistently imports more than it
exports, it will have to spend that much more on domestic investment
if it would maintain domestic production, growth, and employment.
And if a nation succeeds in exporting substantially more than it im-
ports, it can rely less upon domestic investment expenditure to fill the
gap that emerges between production and consumption expenditure as
it grows. This accounts in part for the attraction of the export-led
growth policies pursued by many nations through history, and perhaps
even for the appeal of mercantilism itself in earlier eras.265 The prob-
lem, however, is that this amounts to exportation of the nation's un-
derconsumption problem to other nations; one nation's success is
necessarily another's failure in this "game."
Now suppose that a nation does persistently import more than it
exports-indeed much more, as has been the case with the United
States over the past decade and a half. Suppose also that this nation's
central bank operates under a mandate, as does the U.S. Fed, 266 to act
as a countercyclical actor in respect of the credit-money supply, with a
view to maintaining both price stability and a high level of employ-
ment.267 Suppose finally that wealth and income gaps between upper
and lower tiers in the distribution are large and still growing in the
265. For an overview of mercantilist thought and its relation to classical theory, see,
e.g., THIFE GENERAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 333-71.
266. See supra Part 1.B.1(d); see also A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 5, at
1283-86 (describing the Fed's role in preventing the emergence and inflation of asset
price bubbles).
267. The mandate is laid down in the opening sections of the Federal Reserve Act.
See 12 U.S.C. § 225A (2006).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
[Vol. 16:401
BRET'ON WOODS 1.0
nation in question, as is the case in the United States, 268 such that a
large and growing portion of the nation's wealth is directed less to
consumption and more to speculative trading on asset markets. 269 In
such case the nation's central bank will be faced with a very difficult
task. For the larger the excess of imports over exports-that is, the
larger the trade deficit-the looser will the bank's monetary policy
have to be to comply with its mandate to maintain aggregate demand
and employment at home. That will be what is required to "sterilize,"
as central banks call it, the loss of foreign exchange. 270 And of course,
the longer the trade deficit endures, the longer the loose monetary pol-
icy will have to be maintained.
Against such a backdrop, it is not difficult to appreciate how a
nation that runs persistent trade deficits can come to experience diffi-
culty in attempting to control its own credit-money supply. For one
thing, its monetary authority will be under great pressure to maintain
loose credit and monetary conditions at home simply to maintain do-
mestic economic activity and employment. For by dint of its trade
deficit, the nation is effectively disinvesting more than it is investing
in this form. For another thing, exporting nations with which the na-
tion in question runs trade deficits can find it tempting not only to
hoard surplus-for reasons we shall presently consider-but also to
do something more: insofar as they recycle the surplus in the form of
investment in the deficit country, they will be tempted to do so in the
form of consumer credit, with a view to financing yet more imports
from the surplus country. Persistent surplus nations, in other words,
not only might hoard, but might use the surplus to generate yet more
surplus, hence yet more deficits and unproductive debt on the part of
the deficit nation. Such, we shall see, is much the relation that obtains
between China and the United States, with China serving both as
seller and consumer finance provider (for purchase of Chinese goods)
to the United States.
268. On these measures, see, for example Robert Hockett, What Kinds of Stock Own-
ership Plans Should There Be? Of ESOPs, Other SOPs, and "Ownership Societies",
92 CORNEH.. L. Rivv. 865 (2007); Gabriel Palma, The Revenge of the Market on the
Rentiers, 33 CAM. J. ECON. 1 (2009).
269. For more on the diminishing marginal propensity to consume, see supra Part
I.B.1.
270. Note that central banks also are sometimes hard put to sterilize incoming for-
eign exchange when the nation racks up trade surpluses. Unbalanced trade presents all
central banks with challenges in controlling domestic credit-money conditions. It is
easier, however, to sterilize incoming foreign reserves than outgoing ones, as we shall
see. For the use of capital controls for such purposes does not smack of the taboo
known as "protectionism" in the manner that sterilizing outflows does.
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Finally, if it should happen that a particular deficit nation's cur-
rency occupies a particularly important role in the international trading
order, such that it tends to be viewed as a secure investment asset or
reserve currency in its own right, the nation's plight as just described
will be exacerbated. For nations that are inclined to hoard, perhaps in
response to perceived financial insecurity, will tend disproportionately
to seek that nation's currency rather as nations used to hoard gold.
That will in turn tend to prevent the value of the currency in question
from declining in a manner that might restore balance to the nation's
external trading accounts. Insofar as the nation in question tends both
to be viewed and to view itself as responsible for maintaining global
political stability-by acting as the world's market and borrower of
last resort so as to maintain global economic growth-moreover, the
problem will be all the worse.
In short, then, against the Keynesian backdrop, the absence of
gradual, routine exchange rate adjustment and a bona fide global cur-
rency can combine to produce or enhance persistent trade deficits on
the part of any nation whose currency becomes the functional
equivalent of a global currency. And that will in turn render the nation
in question less able to manage its own credit-money supply, hence
financial and "real" economic activity, at home. Its central bank will
have to keep money loose in the interest of maintaining domestic de-
mand even as domestic asset markets heat up-particularly if wealth
and income are concentrated at the top. In a world with liberal cross-
border trading arrangements, in other words, the absence of a global
Keynesian collective agent precludes the existence of an effective do-
mestic Keynesian collective agent where money and finance are con-
cerned. I am now going to argue that this fact provides the key to
understanding the presently precarious financial and broader economic
position of the U.S., and ultimately the world, economies.
2. The United States as (Shocked) Global Shock-Absorber
Central bankers and other authorities over the past decade have
observed, with growing frequency, both that global interest rates are
surprisingly low and that global savings are surprisingly high. Alan
Greenspan was one such authority, toward the end of his tenure as
Chairman of the Federal Reserve. 27' Ben Bernanke has been another,
271. See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks to the International Monetary Conference (June 6, 2005), available at http:II
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050606/default.htm.
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since shortly before beginning his current tenure in the same post.2
72
The reason that people have found these rates surprising is that world
economic growth in the past decade and a half has been high by his-
toric standards, and high growth rates generally tend to bring high, not
low, rates of interest.2 73 Data compiled by the IMF suggests that world
economic growth proceeded at close to a four percent rate from late in
the last millennium until the recent credit crunch-a period coinciding
with the U.S. bubbles and bursts described in the previous section.
274
Real interest rates, meanwhile, have hovered near two percent.2 75 And
that includes not only short-term, but long-term rates as well. 2 76 The
last decade that saw a juxtaposition like this one, intriguingly enough,
was that from 1919 to 1929, during which global real interest rates
averaged about 1.8% and growth about 3.4%.277
The "conundrum," as Chairman Greenspan put it,278 of low
global interest rates' juxtaposition with high global growth rates has a
twin. This twin is the accrual and flow of massive savings in recent
years, not in the developed economies and toward the developing
ones, respectively, but the other way round. In stark contrast to the
classical picture of "mature" economies' investing surplus in "imma-
ture" economies, in other words, the latter have been "investing" sur-
pluses in the former. The sheer numbers involved render the story all
the more surprising. The United States and the United Kingdom, to
take the most conspicuous examples within the "developed" world,
are by far the lowest domestic net savers and largest recipients of ex-
ternally originating "investment" capital. 279 Meanwhile China, a few
other East Asian nations, and the petroleum exporting nations, to take
the most conspicuous examples within the "developing" world, are by
272. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit, Sandridge Lecture at
the Virginia Association of Economists (Mar. 10, 2005), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050414/default.htm.
273. Id.
274. See IMF WORID) ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 261, at 189.
275. Id. at 220.
276. Id.
277. See Luis Catao & George A. Mackenzie, Perspectives on Low Global Interest
Rates, 9, 17 (IMF Working Paper WP/06/76, 2006), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp0676.pdf.
278. Federal Reserve Board's Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress
Before the S. Comm. On Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2005)
(testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd.), available at http://
www. federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/2005/february/testimony.htm.
279. See IMF WORID ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 261, at 30-37.
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far the highest domestic savers and largest suppliers of cross-border
"investment" capital.
28 0
At least as surprising-when considered in isolation-as the co-
presence of low global real interest rates and high global growth rates
over the past decade, then, has been the emergence of certain develop-
ing nations as the world's principal savers and "investors," and of cer-
tain developed nations as the world's principal dis-savers and
recipients of "investment" capital. I now want to suggest that neither
of these anomalies remains puzzling when considered, not in isolation,
but together. For it is easy to account for the first by reference to the
second. And it is easy to account for the second, in turn, by reference
to an historically not unfamiliar phenomenon-namely, the foreign
exchange practices of nations that run persistent trade surpluses.
To begin the explanation, consider first the source of the Chinese
and petroleum exporting nations' "savings glut," as Chairman
Bernanke has described it.28 1 China, as well as several other mainly
East Asian developing economies and the petroleum exporting na-
tions, have enjoyed massive and growing trade surpluses over the past
decade.2 82 These surpluses have been matched by equally massive and
growing current account deficits on the part of the United States and,
to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom and a few other European na-
tions.2 8 3 Now, by definition, a current account surplus always entails a
gap between savings and domestic investment. Domestic investment,
in other words, does not account for all of a nation's savings when the
nation enjoys a current account surplus. For "external investment"-
exports-always account for a portion of savings as well. Parallel re-
marks hold of a current account deficit. A nation with a trade deficit is
by definition a nation in which domestic savings are less than domesti-
cally-originating "investment." We will return to this presently.
The next step to take in accounting for our recent twin global
anomalies is to consider the form that Chinese savings take. While it is
280. Id.
281. Bernanke, supra note 272.
282. Id.; see also INT'L MONETARY FUN), GENERAL AND SPECIAL SDR ALLOCA-
TIONS (2009) [hereinafter SDR ALLOCATIONS], available at http://www.imf.org/
external/np/tre/sdr/proposal/2009/pdf/0709.pdf; Venkatesan Vembu, China Cannot
Really Dump the Dollar, DAILY NEWS & ANALYSIS (Mumbai), July 13, 2009, http:H
www.dnaindia.com/money/interview china-cannot-really-dump-the-dollar 1273469-
all.
283. Bernanke, supra note 272; see also SDR ALLOCATIONS, supra note 282;
Vembu, supra note 282.
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true that households in China save much,2 84 it also is true that by far
the greater part of savings in China takes the form of government
surpluses on the one hand, and state-owned business enterprises' re-
tained earnings on the other.2 85 Meanwhile, China consumes less than
half of its GDP,28 6 and spends a surprisingly small share of its savings
on domestic investment-even though domestic investment is so high
as to have led to a remarkable degree of overcapacity.
287
The final question to consider in explaining our recent twin
global anomalies is what those in the surplus nations who hold sur-
pluses are doing with them. And as it happens, the two principal an-
swers to this question quickly dissipate the air of paradox often found
to attend recent trends in the global economy. Broadly speaking, sur-
plus nations have been employing their savings in two ways, each of
which has dramatically diminished the capacities of central banks in
deficit-running nations to modulate credit-money supplies in the man-
ner I have argued in Part I.B.l to be necessary if boom and bust cycles
are to be smoothened or ended.
The first use to which surplus nations, especially China, have
been putting their surpluses is to intervene in foreign exchange mar-
kets to purchase other nations' currencies-principally, by far, that of
the United States. The numbers are quite telling. In the first five years
of the present millennium, emerging market economies amassed over
two and half trillion dollars in foreign currency reserves. 288 The Asian
emerging market countries, in turn, accounted for approximately $1.1
trillion-sixty percent-of the accumulation. 2 89 Within this group, in
turn, China alone accounted for nearly a trillion, or about half, of the
accumulation. 290 Since then China's role as foreign exchange accumu-
lator has exploded, with an additional quarter trillion in reserves accu-
mulated in 2006, and an additional half trillion in 2007.291 As if this
were not striking enough, these additional accumulations actually ex-
ceed China's and the rest of East Asia's current account surpluses
over the years in question. Even a growing portion of domestically
284. Nicholas R. Lardy, China: Rebalancing Economic Growth, in THE: CHINA BAL-
ANCE SHEET IN 2007 AND BI1YOND I, 12 (2008) (describing the recent increase in the
saving rate of Chinese households to around twenty-five percent since the year 2000).
285. Id. at 15-16.
286. Id. at 2.
287. Id. at 6-8.
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generated savings, in other words, are going into the hoarding of for-
eign currency-principally dollars.
292
Comparable figures for petroleum exporting nations tell a similar
story, albeit with smaller magnitude. Middle Eastern petroleum ex-
porters ran current account surpluses of about $200 billion in
2005-07, while Russia and its Commonwealth of Independent States
peers ran about half that.293 In both cases, moreover, the surpluses and
then some were employed to amass large foreign currency reserves. 294
The end result, as of 2007, was a global stock of foreign currency
reserves totaling well over $5 trillion, with East Asian nations ac-
counting for a bit over three-fifths of the total and China for about
one-quarter of the world total.
295
The next thing to note is the composition of this pool of foreign
currency reserves. According to Bank of International Settlements
(BIS) data,296 a bit over two-thirds of all foreign exchange reserves
other than China's in the current millennium have been held in dollar
denominated instruments.297 The percentage of China's reserves rep-
resented by dollars is surely significantly higher, but cannot be deter-
mined with precision because China provides no official information
concerning its reserves.
The reasons that one can confidently surmise China holds a sig-
nificantly higher portion of its reserves in dollars even than the two-
thirds ratio of the rest of the world are straightforward. First, it is esti-
mated on independent grounds that approximately seventy-five per-
cent of the world's holdings of foreign exchange reserves take the
form of dollars; China must then account for the total being so much
greater than that accounted for by non-Chinese dollar-accumulators. 298
Second, China evidently intervenes in the global foreign ex-
change markets, in other words, purchasing dollars in order to prevent
dollar depreciation relative to the renminbi. 299 It apparently does so at
least in part precisely because depreciation would increase the U.S.
cost of imports from China. This observation takes us straight to the
"mercantilist" part of our story, which is possessed of both innocent
and, perhaps, sometimes less innocent components.
292. Id. at 215.
293. Id. at 206.
294. Id. at 214.
295. Id.
296. For more on the Bank of International Settlements, see infra Part III.A.
297. See Philip D. Wooldridge, The Changing Composition of Official Reserves, BIS
Q. Riw., Sept. 2006, at 25, 34.
298. See id.
299. See Lardy, supra note 284, at 19-20.
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There appear to be three principal reasons for global hoarding not
only of foreign currencies in general, but of the U.S. currency in par-
ticular. Two of these are what I will call "risk-aversively mercantilist,"
the other is what I shall call "aggressively mercantilist." The risk-aver-
sively mercantilist motives are, of course, more innocent than the ag-
gressively mercantilist motives-though as we shall see, all three
motives would be removed from each nation's calculus were we to
subject global trade to an updated rendition of the Keynesian Clearing
Union arrangement described in Part I.B.2. To begin, then, with the
perhaps aggressively mercantilist motive, it is a commonplace that the
economic growth strategies pursued by East Asian nations since the
1950s have been what one calls "export-led." 300 The aim, pursued by
domestic ministries devoted tellingly to "trade and industry," has been
to channel domestic investment toward industries that produce goods
for export.30 This way industries that economies of scale, existing
comparative advantage patterns, or insufficient domestic demand
would otherwise render inefficient or difficult to develop at home, can
be developed nevertheless.
Postwar history appears to vindicate this strategy. Export-led
growth has paid rich dividends first in Germany and Japan, then in
South Korea, and later in the other "East Asian Tiger" economies
from the early 1950s down to the present day.30 2 The strategy only
works, however, so long as the currencies of targeted export markets
do not appreciate to restore trade balance between exporting and im-
porting nations, per the classic Humean "specie flow" dynamic. 3° 3 It is
accordingly not surprising that Japan and its successor "tigers" histori-
cally have intervened-and in some cases continue to intervene-in
foreign exchange markets to prevent the dollar in particular from ap-
preciating. 30 4 For the United States long has been the preferred foreign
300. See W. M. Corden, Those Current Account Imbalances: A Sceptical View, 30
WoRIr ECON. 363, 367 (2007).
301. See generally W.M. Corden, Exchange Rate Protection, in TH. INTERNATIONAL
MONFIrARY SYSTIn-M UNIz Fi.i:;xlini EXCI-IAN(;I RATIS 17 (Richard N. Cooper et al.
eds. 1982) (discussing the concept of exchange rate protection).
302. See, e.g., HA-YooN CHANG, KICKIN; AWAY THIE LADDIR 49-51 (2003)
(describing the East Asian "miracle" as the result of macroeconomic policies facilitat-
ing export surpluses).
303. David Hume provided the foundational theory of specie flow-of the notion
that currency valuations react to the balance of trade between exporting and importing
nations-in the classic essay DAvI) HUMi7, Of the Balance of Trade, in ESSAYS
MORAl-, POIITICAI., ANI LITIRARY 316 (Oxford University Press 1963).
304. See, e.g., Masaru Yoshitomi, et al., East Asia's Role in Resolving the New
Global Imbalances, in GiLOBAL IMBAI ANCFIS AN DivlI.OI'ING COUNTRIES: RI!MIII3S
FOR A FAIIJNG INTFPRNATIONAI. FINANCIAl. SYSTI;M 19, 23 (Jan Joost Teunissen & Age
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market for export-led growth purposes. Nor is it all that surprising,
one supposes, that China would have noticed the successes wrought
through this strategy as pursued by its near neighbors.
What is somewhat more surprising, however, is that China would
seem to have less reason, at least in the long run, than its neighbors to
rely as heavily as it does upon export-led growth. For unlike them, it
enjoys a potentially gargantuan internal market, such that scale econo-
mies do not require it to produce for export in order to develop heavy
industry at home. What is more, as noted above, Chinese investment
in domestic productive capacity appears thus far to have outpaced
even potential internal demand. It currently produces steel, to take one
example, in excess of current domestic needs by an amount equal to
the total current production of Japan, the world's second largest pro-
ducer.30 5 China thus appears to be exporting what would otherwise be
a (presumably temporary) domestic underconsumption problem to the
United States, which, as a developed economy, faces underconsump-
tion vulnerability aplenty of its own, for reasons elaborated in Part
I.B.1.
On the other hand, the degree and scale of underdevelopment that
long has afflicted and still afflicts China-where hundreds of millions
of people still remain in dire poverty 3 6-goes some way toward ex-
plaining its refusal thus far to rely upon internal markets. The difficult
transition to well spread growth and prosperity is presumably eased by
reliance on already huge, well-developed markets like that of the
United States. Whatever the motives, however, China is following a
well-trodden path, and its currency practices reflect that fact. It inter-
venes massively in foreign exchange markets to prevent the dollar
from appreciating relative to its currency, in order to keep its trade
surpluses with the United States likewise massive and growing. 307 We
Akkerman eds., 2007) ("East Asian central banks have kept exchange rates low by
intervening in foreign exchange markets and purchasing US securities.")
305. Lardy, supra note 284, at 6.
306. See Miguel Nino-Zarazua & Tony Addison, Redefining Poverty in China and
India, UNrni3 NATIONS UNIVERSITY (Apr. 10, 2012), http://unu.edu/publications/arti-
cles/redefining-poverty-in-china-and-india.html.
307. Another possible motive, which I do not explore here, at least bears mentioning.
China's hoard of dollars affords it a potential strategic benefit. Were it to dump its
massive dollar holdings on the global foreign exchange market, it could wreak sudden
havoc on the dollar. (As Lenin observed many decades ago, the most efficient means
of destroying a nation might be to debase its currency.) Presumably China would not
consider it advantageous to do anything like this unless it considered the trade advan-
tages it accrues owing to dollar strength no longer advantageous or, perhaps,
sustainable.
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shall return to the effect this wreaks on the U.S. and global financial
systems presently.
The two "risk-aversively mercantilist" policies pursued by the
foreign exchange accumulators can be seen at work not only in Chi-
nese and East Asian policy, but more widely as well. Both also are
closely related. The thing to remember here is the comparatively re-
cent experience these accumulators have had with globalization-facili-
tated financial crisis. It tends now, a bit over ten years after the fact, to
be forgotten that until the new millennium many developing countries,
even those in East Asia, relied heavily upon highly liquid foreign in-
vestment-typically dollar-denominated bank lending-for internal
development purposes. 30 8 Surplus capital in this period tended to flow
as it historically always has done until recently-from developed re-
gions like the United States, Europe, and Japan toward lesser devel-
oped countries like those in East Asia and Latin America.
309
The liberalization of global banking and financial markets over
the later 1980s and early 1990s of course facilitated the pronounced
growth in flows during this period. 310 But they also enabled the flows
to reverse on a dime, so to speak. 31' Fears concerning nepotistic and
"crony capitalist" domestic business and financial practices in recipi-
ent nations at the end of the 1990s prompted spectacularly rapid
"panic" withdrawals of funds from, and calls upon debt owed by firms
in and governments of, those nations.312 Private and public institutions
in the nations in question were hard put to make good on their debts
using their own currencies, in turn, owing to lack of confidence in
their governments and central banks, hence their currencies, as pro-
nounced as the distrust of their business entities. 3 3 There were "runs"
on these countries' currencies, in other words, as dramatic as the runs
on their firms. The upshots of these panics included the storied "peso
crisis" of 1995, the "Asian Financial Crisis" of 1997-99, the "ruble
crisis" and Russian default of the same period, and the Argentine de-
fault of 2001.314 Domestic entities owing dollar-denominated debt
were rapidly rendered insolvent as the debts were called in and domes-
308. For more on this recent history, see Macro to Micro, supra note 3.
309. See id.
310. CHARI.11S P. KINDII.IRcGI21R & ROBERT AI.IuF;R, MANIAS, PANICS, ANI) CRASHES
244 (5th ed. 2005).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 246-48.
313. Id.
314. Id.
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tic currencies plummeted, wreaking havoc first in domestic financial,
then in the "real" economies of the affected countries.
31 5
It is not then surprising, against this backdrop, that the very na-
tions implicated in the crises of the 1990s and early 2000s are among
the largest accumulators of foreign reserves-in particular, dollar
reserves-today. For these reserves-especially the dollar reserves-
serve as historically reliable cushions against runs on domestic curren-
cies and investment vehicles. It is for precisely this reason that nations
with healthy economic growth trends historically have tended to hold
foreign reserves in amounts roughly equal to the value of short term
external debt-debt with maturity of one year or less. What remains
striking in this connection, however, is that in the first decade of the
new millennium, the principal hoarding nations are holding foreign
currency-again, mainly dollar-reserves well in excess not only of
short term debt, but of all debt. 31 6 Such gaps suggest either very mor-
bid degrees of risk-aversion vis-a-vis prospective runs on debt, or, per-
haps, more aggressively mercantilist motives for hoarding-viz.,
currency manipulation in the interest of export maintenance as de-
scribed above.
The other risk-aversive motive for holding foreign exchange and
especially dollars is closely related to that just described but more
broadly sweeping. It is, essentially, just Keynes's "speculative" mo-
tive for money-holding described earlier in Part I.B.I. In financially
volatile times, parties naturally attempt to maintain liquidity cush-
ions. 31 7 Within a domestic economy, that means hoarding the domes-
tic currency.31 8 In the world economy, it means hoarding the closest
substitute to a global currency. And that is the dollar, the world's de
facto "reserve currency." Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, this fact under-
writes a dysfunctionally self-reinforcing tendency in the global econ-
omy much like those found in part Part I.B.I to afflict any developed
domestic economy in the Keynesian vision. In essence, global finan-
cial turbulence prompts more holding of the world's monetary "safe
haven," its reserve currency-the dollar. But heightened demand for
the dollar for hoarding purposes of course maintains or worsens the
current U.S. account deficits with the rest of the world. And those
trade imbalances in turn worsen U.S. and hence global financial turbu-
315. Id. at 246.
316. See Laurence H. Summers, Reflections on Global Account Imbalances and
Emerging Markets Reserve Accumulation at the Reserve Bank of India L.K. Jha Me-
morial Lecture (Mar. 24, 2006).
317. See THE GENERAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 166-74.
318. Id.
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lence itself. In effect, this is a financially-inflected rendition of the
bind foreseen by economist Robert Triffin shortly after Bretton Woods
settled on a plan for the IMF more like White's than Keynes's. 31 9 The
bind, at the time named "the Triffin dilemma," ultimately brought the
first Bretton Woods regime to grief in 1971, and its finance-inflected
contemporary rendition is bringing the subsequent regime to grief
now.
320
The fundamental reason is that, as observed above in Part II.B.1,
a current account deficit is functionally equivalent to domestic disin-
vestment, meaning the gap that Part I.B. I observed to open between
production and expenditure in any developed country is not filled by
domestic investment. The only way to maintain domestic growth and
employment in such circumstances is through expansionary monetary
policy on the part of the central bank and fiscal policy on the part of
the central government. 32' That is what "sterilization" of foreign ex-
change flows amounts to in a deficit-running nation. But this of course
fuels inflation in consumer goods, financial asset markets, or both,
322
all on a growing structure of debt-much of the latter obligingly sup-
plied by the surplus running nations themselves, who in effect serve as
consumer finance companies on behalf of their producer-affiliate's in-
creasingly indebted customer. 323 And so the persistent deficit-running
nation, forced and then aided and abetted by its creditor nations,
lurches into debt-fueled asset price bubble territory of the kind de-
scribed earlier. In short, then, while domestic hoarding is the antithe-
sis of overinvestment and consequent overheated growth, external
hoarding tends symmetrically to induce overinvestment and over-
319. See Macro to Micro, supra note 3, at 168-74.
320. It might more aptly have been named the "Keynes dilemma," or the "Mlynarski
dilemma," for reasons cited supra note 18. For more on the history of this bind, see
Macro to Micro, supra note 3, at 162-74.
321. See supra Part ll.B.I.
322. In Triffin's day, domestic financial markets were more tightly regulated than
today, and capital controls prevented them from being global in scope. Thus, the infla-
tion problem afflicted mainly the consumer goods and services markets-as happened
in the U.S. from the later 1960s well into the 1970s and even early 1980s. (It is no
accident, incidentally, that Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker's successful breaking
of consumer price inflation occurred after he raised domestic interest rates to levels
around twenty percent circa 1982, but also by formal agreements with the German and
Japanese central banks to engineer a significant devaluation of the dollar relative to
the Deutschemark and the yen shortly thereafter. For more on this, see infra Part Il.)
Today's rendition of the "Triffin dilemma," by contrast, is afflicting the U.S. financial
markets, where we have just been through two hyperinflations.
323. In view of the fungibility of money, that financing itself can spill over into the
broader economy, feeding debt-fueled asset price hyperinflations of the sort we've
just experienced.
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heated growth-at least in the nation that issues the world's de facto
reserve currency and, largely in consequence, also supplies its con-
sumer market of last resort.
When one nation supplies the world's reserve currency, then, it is
not able to maintain external trade balance with the rest of the world,
or to control its credit-money supply, in the manner prescribed by
bona fide Keynesians as discussed in Part I. The nation might enjoy
what Valery Giscard d'Estaing, as French Minister of Finance, de-
plored as the "exorbitant privilege" of borrowing cheap from the
world for a period of years-as the United States did in the 1960s and
does again now. 324 But it will not be able to continue in any such role
indefinitely. At some point either its currency must depreciate, its con-
sumer goods and services markets must fall prey to inflation, or its
financial system must overheat and then crash and burn in response to
the growing internal debt burden. This is precisely why Keynes's
Clearing Union plan featured both a non-national global currency and
an automatic currency-adjustment mechanism. Hence in the next Part
we shall return to that plan and update it.
II.
BALANCE RESTORED: A 21ST CENTURY CLEARING UNION
Part I explained why, in an economy possessed of money and a
financial sector, credit-modulation is prerequisite to financial stability,
hence to sustainable growth and full employment. It also explained the
sense in which the credit-modulatory role amounts to a characteristic
central banking function. Part II, in turn, explained why, under liberal
cross-border trading arrangements, the central banking function can-
not successfully be played domestically unless it also is played glob-
ally. It made the case theoretically by extending the analysis of Part I
from the "closed" to the "open" economy context, then corroborated
the theoretical case by reference to salient empirics of the past fifteen
years.
In this Part, I aim to schematize the "global central bank"-what
Part I called the "missing Keynesian agent"-that I have suggested we
require. In essence, I shall sketch the broad contours of an institution
that can serve as an instrumentality of nations' central banks much as
those central banks themselves serve as instrumentalities of nations'
citizens and their domestic banking institutions.
324. See Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas & Helene Roy, From World Banker to World
Venture Capitalist: U.S. External Adjustment and the Exorbitant Privilege, in G7
CURRENT ACCOUNT IMBALANCES: SUSTAINABILITY AND ADJUSTMENT 11, 12 n.4
(Richard Clarida ed., 2007); see also Macro to Micro, supra note 3, at 171.
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The institution I have in mind looks much like Keynes's original
Clearing Union in its basic functions, but will be built upon presently
existing institutional infrastructures in a manner that I believe will
cause no more disruption than necessary to the functioning of the in-
stitution itself. As it happens, present day modes of bank-to-bank in-
teraction, as well as the foreign exchange infrastructure and other
institutional structures, lend themselves readily to the addition of this
one new banking layer that I shall propose. I shall begin, then, by
sketching the essentials of those structures themselves. Then I shall
sketch the new institution.
A. Relevant Present-Day Infrastructure
This Subpart briefly sketches the relevant components of the ex-
isting financial architecture with which the new Clearing Union plan
that I shall sketch must engage in one way or another. The next Sub-
part will then offer that new Clearing Union plan itself.
1. The Group of Twenty
Any outline of the present global financial architecture, particu-
larly since our most recent financial crisis, must begin with the Group
of Twenty, or G20. The G20 has become in recent years the premier
plenary governance body where international financial and economic
questions are concerned. 325 Comprising the finance ministers and cen-
tral bank chiefs of the largest developed and emerging market coun-
tries, it was formally constituted in 1999, in the wake of the Asian
Financial Crisis of the late 1990s. Since then it has met annually, and
in the wake of our most recent crisis it has displaced that smaller fo-
rum comprising the finance ministers and central bank chiefs of only
developed nations known as the G8. 326
Most significant policy measures recently adopted by developed
and emerging market nations with the largest economies have been
adopted pursuant to agreements reached at G20 summits. While the
Bank for International Settlements and the International Monetary
Fund handle month to month, and day to day, challenges posed by
global financial and economic affairs, the G20 broadly oversees those
affairs. The G20 can be viewed as the "board of directors" of global
economic affairs. I shall accordingly have occasion from time to time
to refer back to the G20 in the remainder of this Part.
325. See HAL SCOTT, INTERNATIONAI_ FINANCE 48-65 (14th ed. 2010).
326. Id.
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2. The Bank for International Settlements
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is widely known
only indirectly, through its Basel Committee on Bank Supervision.3 27
The Committee, comprising bank regulators from less than thirty na-
tions, meets regularly to discuss issues of common concern and strate-
gies for dealing with them. 328 It produces a series of "capital accords,"
which establish common "core" standards for the regulation of bank
buffer capital holdings. 329 The most recent accord recommended the
optional imposition of new "countercyclical" capital buffers. 330 Char-
acteristically, the Basel Committee thereby outpaced many domestic
central banks in recognizing the critical role central banks must play
as modulators of credit-rooted financial cycling.
The BIS deserves to be known for much more than the Basel
Committee, however. For one thing, it serves quite literally as a "cen-
tral bank for central banks." It does so, for example, in the sense that
national central banks hold foreign reserves there-a fact I shall ex-
ploit in the new Clearing Union I shall propose below. 33 1 For another
327. See DANIEL K. TARULUO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL REGULATION 2-3 (2008) (describing the composition, objectives, and ac-
tivities of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision).
328. BASEL COMMITrEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, HISTORY OF THE BASEl. COM-
MIT-i-EE AND ITS MEMBERSHIP 1 (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/
history.pdf.
329. Id. at 2-3.
330. Press Release, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int'l Settlement,
Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision Announces Higher Global Minimum
Capital Standards (Sept. 12, 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/press/pIO0912.
pdf.
331. It does so in other senses as well. Here, for example, is the BIS's own summary
of its "traditional banking" role:
[T]he BIS has always performed "traditional" banking functions for the
central bank community (eg [sic] gold and foreign exchange transac-
tions), as well as trustee and agency functions. The BIS was the agent for
the European Payments Union (EPU, 1950-58), helping the European
currencies restore convertibility after the Second World War. Similarly,
the BIS has acted as the agent for various European exchange rate ar-
rangements, including the European Monetary System (EMS, 1979-94)
which preceded the move to a single currency. Finally, the BIS has also
provided or organised emergency financing to support the international
monetary system when needed. During the 1931-33 financial crisis, the
BIS organised support credits for both the Austrian and German central
banks. In the 1960s, the BIS arranged special support credits for the
French franc (1968), and two so-called Group Arrangements (1966 and
1968) to support sterling. More recently, the BIS has provided finance in
the context of IMF-led stabilisation programmes (eg for Mexico in 1982
and Brazil in 1998).
BIS History-Overview, BANK FOR INT'L SErIruMENrTs, http://www.bis.org/about/
history.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
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thing, the BIS is the preeminent forum at which those "collective
agents" coordinate policies.332 Finally, the BIS's secretariat and re-
search support staff consistently track indicators of potential monetary
and financial instability-rather than only consumer price inflation-
and advocate that central banks act as modulators of such
instability.
333
The BIS thus constitutes an ideal forum at which those national
collective agents known as central banks, which ordinarily act on be-
half of their national constituents, can "collect themselves" more or
less into a transnational collective agent as well. The BIS allows na-
tional banks to act on behalf of all whose wellbeing the global finan-
cial system significantly affects.
Historically speaking, it is no accident that the BIS is well situ-
ated to play these related roles. It was more or less designed to do so
in 1930, the last time the global financial system came to grief in the
wake of twin stock price and real estate bubble collapses. 334 However,
the BIS came to be perceived as tainted by the roles some of its early
personnel, including Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht, had played in
the German economy once the Nazis took power in 1933. 3 35 Indeed,
partly for this reason, the BIS nearly found itself liquidated during the
Bretton Woods conference of 1944, to be replaced altogether by the
newly constituted IMF. 336 It was the intervention, in fact, of none
other than Keynes and his U.K. delegation that ultimately rescued the
institution. 3 37 All the more fitting, then, that I propose the BIS itself as
situs of the new Clearing Union that I sketch below.
3. The International Monetary Fund
As discussed above in Part I.B.2, the IMF emerged, in lieu of
Keynes's Clearing Union, from the very conference at which Keynes
pushed his proposal. Then and now, the differences between Fund and
Union have been quite substantial. For one thing, the Fund never has
332. See Press Release, Bank for Int'l Settlements, Financial Stability Forum Re-
established as the Financial Stability Board (Apr. 3, 2009), available at http:/
www.bis.org/press/p090403a.htm.
333. See, for example, the many articles written by Claudio Borio and William
White prior to 2006, available at http://www.bis.org/, which do just that.
334. For the relevant history of the BIS, see, for example, GIANNI ToNIOI.O WITH THE
ASSISTANCE oF PnIr Ci.F]MENT, CENTRAl, BANK COOPIERATION AT THE BANK FOR IN-
TERNATIONAI. SETrTI.FMINTS, 1930-1973 (2005). See generally LIAQUAT AHAMI' D,
LoR~sD OF FINANCE: TH. BANKERS WHO BROKE THE WORI ) (2009).
335. See AHAMED, supra note 334, at 59-84.
336. See TONIOI.O, supra note 334, at 267-71.
337. See id.
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cleared cross-border transactions. For another thing, the Fund never
has served as a significant issuer of global liquidity or as a modulator
of global trade imbalances. Instead it has played two principal roles,
one of them more prominent for its first thirty years, the other more
prominent since.
338
The Fund's first prominent role was to maintain stable currency
relations by using the "par value system" that emerged from the Bret-
ton Woods Conference. This system pegged all currencies to fixed
exchange rates relative to the U.S. dollar, which in turn was fixed to
gold at the rate of $35 per ounce.339 Nations that found their curren-
cies losing value relative to the dollar owing to persistent trade deficits
were obliged to defend their currencies by expending gold or foreign
currency reserves. 340 Where such proved impossible, nations could
borrow from the "fund" of currency reserves from which the Fund
drew its name (these were supplied by member nations in the form of
GDP-linked "quotas"). To draw from the fund, nations had to meet
certain conditions, namely domestic deflationary measures meant to
trim appetites for imports. 341 Should loans from the fund fail to stabi-
lize a nation's currency, the last resort short of expulsion, would be for
the Fund to devalue that nation's currency in an orderly manner. 342
The par value system came a cropper in the late 1960s and early
1970s, when the currency that lay at its heart could no longer act as a
transnational reserve currency. The United States ran deficits in such
profusion that it lost the capacity to defend its currency with gold or
foreign exchange reserves, and the Fund lacked sufficient resources to
fill the gap.343 Moreover, the United States was, sensibly enough, un-
willing to deflate its economy, which would have been politically un-
acceptable domestically. Moreover, domestic deflation in this case
would quickly have issued in global deflation. 344
The United States could not play its appointed role as national
supplier of a transnational reserve currency without racking up mas-
sive deficits that undermined confidence in the dollar itself.345 That
was the "Triffin dilemma" noted above. 346 And, as Part H suggests,
338. See Macro to Micro, supra note 3, at 166-74.
339. Id. at 171.
340. Id. at 169.
341. Id. at 184-89.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 168-74.
345. Id. at 169-72.
346. Id. at 168-69.
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we are still living with it because we chose the IMF instead of
Keynes's clearing agent.
After Nixon upset the par value system by unilaterally sus-
pending the dollar's convertibility to gold, the IMF began to play a
second role. It now serves as a forum through which central banking
and finance ministers jointly manage the so-called "dirty float" among
currencies. 347 Currencies are permitted to vary in value relative to one
another in response to trading activity on the foreign exchange mar-
ket.348 That's the float. National officials, however, routinely coordi-
nate interventions-purchases and sales-in those markets in order to
influence both the directions in which, and the rates at which, such
adjustments take place. That's the "dirty" part of it. The Fund facili-
tates that coordination.
349
The Fund also plays several ancillary roles that bear noting. First,
its staff, like staff at the BIS and the Financial Stability Forum, track
and study both global and domestic monetary and financial develop-
ments with a view to emerging problems. 350 Its staff also consults
with member nations about domestic monetary, financial, and comple-
mentary legal and regulatory matters. Second, the Fund continues to
provide loans to nations that find themselves in temporary monetary
or financial trouble, whether this be to assist them in defending their
currencies or simply to afford them "breathing space" as they act to
stabilize conditions at home.
35 1
As in the early days, of course, strings are attached in the form of
"conditions," which often prove controversial both for their deflation-
ary biases and for their tendency to reflect distinctly anti-Keynesian
economic orthodoxy. 352 Finally, since the final years of the par value
era, the Fund has "issued" a humble transnational quasi-currency
known as the "Special Drawing Right," or "SDR," more on which
below.
4. Special Drawing Rights
As the par value system came under strain in the late 1960s, some
members of the IMF recognized that the Triffin dilemma lay behind
the trouble. 353 The United States could not supply adequate liquidity
347. Id. at 172.
348. Id. at 173.
349. Id. at 176.
350. Id. at 181-83.
351. Id. at 184-87.
352. Id.
353. See id. at 171.
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to finance growing volumes of cross-border trade without jeopardizing
the value of its currency. 354 The Fund accordingly took tentative steps
in the direction of instituting a truly global reserve currency of the sort
Keynes had proposed at Bretton Woods. The result was the Special
Drawing Right, or SDR. The SDR served-and serves-both as a unit
of account like any currency, and as claim upon reserves held by a
member within the Fund.
355
In its role as unit of account, the SDR's value is calculated as a
weighted sum of the values of a "basket" of other major currencies,
currently the dollar, the pound, the yen, and the euro. 356 As the rela-
tive values of those currencies change, so does that of the SDR in
terms of each of them. The IMF posts the SDR's value in terms of the
dollar each day. (Weights assigned to the constituent "basket" curren-
cies are changed regularly, albeit of course much less frequently.)
Several international organizations, notably the IMF and the BIS
themselves, 357 use the SDR as unit of account, a fact I shall exploit
below. A small number of nations now peg their currencies to the
SDR as well. 358 Were the basket of currencies from which the SDR's
value is calculated to be more inclusive-so as to include, say, the
Chinese renminbi, the Indian rupee, the Swiss franc, and the Austra-
lian and Canadian dollars-it might come to function, in its unit of
account role, rather as Keynes's bancor was to do. I shall exploit that
fact as well.
In its role as a claim upon reserves, hence as a form of credit-
money, the SDR functions as a sort of a very modest proto-bancor.
SDRs are allocated to IMF members in proportion to their quota con-
tributions to the Fund itself.359 Because the latter are determined as
functions of GDP rather than global trade volume, however, SDRs are
not allocated in the proportions that Keynes's bancor overdraft privi-
leges would have been. That constitutes one blemish upon them as
means of dealing with trade imbalance, a fact I shall aim below to
remedy. Another such blemish is that SDR holdings with the Fund in
excess of allocation earn interest paid by the Fund, while nations that
354. Id. at 168-72.
355. See id. at 171.
356. INT'l MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND FACTSHEET: SPE
CIAL DRAWING RIGHTS (SDRs) 1 (2012) [hereinafter IMF FAcTSHEET], available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/sdr.pdf.
357. Id.
358. Mar Gudmundsson, The Choice and Design of Exchange Rate Regimes, in CEN-
TRAL BANKS AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT 105, 113 (2006), available at
http://www.bis.org/events/cbcd06h.pdf.
359. IMF FACTSHEIE, supra note 356, at 2.
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draw in excess of their allocations pay interest. 360 Persistent surpluses,
in other words, are rewarded rather than penalized, as they would have
been under Keynes's plan, while deficits are indeed penalized, as they
would have been under Keynes's plan.
The most vitiating blemish on SDRs, however, is simply their
modest magnitude. Although, with approval of the G20, the IMF sub-
stantially boosted SDR allocations to provide more global liquidity in
the thick of financial crisis in 2009, total SDR allocations remain pal-
try in comparison with foreign holdings of U.S. dollars. The numbers
are telling. The total 2009 allocation was worth about $204 billion. 36'
This as compared to well over $5 trillion in foreign currency reserves,
principally dollars, now held by nations running persistent trade sur-
pluses. Nevertheless, there is reason for optimism here. Since the cur-
rent crisis began, SDRs have been allocated in much larger quantities
than before, and some central bankers, notably Zhou Xiaochuan of the
People's Bank of China, have publicly called for the gradual adoption
of the SDR as global reserve currency. 362 If Mr. Xiaochuan was seri-
ous in his praise of Keynes and his bancor, 363 then this is very good
news indeed. This too I shall exploit below.
5. The Foreign Exchange Market
The phrase "foreign exchange market" is apt to connote mystery,
or to conjure up images of crowded and chaotic trading floors, in the
minds of many. 364 In fact, however, this market is surprisingly simple
and even "old-fashioned" in its operations. Banks themselves engage
in foreign exchange transactions, which entail quite literally exchang-
ing currencies with one another. 365 They often do so, however,
through intermediaries-brokers. 366 Foreign exchange brokers, for
their part, are much like stock and bond brokers, with the difference
that they are less likely to trade on their own account. They remain
360. Id. Nations that persistently draw from the fund must pay interest on their
borrowings.
361. See SDR A LOCATIONS, supra note 282.
362. See Zhou Xiaochuan, Governor, People's Bank of China, Address before the
Bank for International Settlements: Reform the International Monetary System (Apr.
29, 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r090402c.pdf.
363. Id. The views of Michael Pettis, a respected analyst of People's Bank of China
policy, suggest otherwise. See Vembu, supra note 282.
364. See generally ScoTr, supra note 325, at 406-17 (detailing matters covered in
the next several paragraphs).
365. Id. at 407-08.
366. Id. at 407. For a general discussion of foreign exchange markets, see MARC
Li.VINSON, Tht; ECONOMIST NiEwsI'AIR GuIDn7 TO FINANCIAl. MARKETS 14-16 (5th
ed. 2010).
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agents rather than acting as principals. They earn their living by col-
lecting brokerage fees in return for bringing counterparty banks,
which seek one another to exchange currencies, together.
The process is straightforward. The broker tells banks the rates,
in terms of one currency, for which there are firm buyers or sellers
available at any given time. 367 The transactions can be either for
"spot" delivery of the currencies in question, or for "forward delivery"
at some later specified date. 368 Often banks will negotiate, anony-
mously, through the broker to arrive at an agreed exchange rate.
369
Once a firm agreement is reached and a transaction consummated, the
broker reveals the identities of the banks and collects a fee. Brokers
also inform banks in general terms the rates at which currencies have
been trading. In effect, then, they keep multiple prospective
counterparties apprised of the "market prices" of various currencies in
terms of other currencies.
Most banks coordinate foreign exchange through brokers, but
some banks that have dealt with one another repeatedly in foreign ex-
change transactions find that they can dispense with brokers alto-
gether. 370 They develop good working relations inter se, and their
dealing rooms work directly with one another. A separate industry of
foreign exchange brokers-a fairly small niche market in any event-
proves ultimately to be unnecessary to them. That fact will prove en-
couraging when I turn to the updated Clearing Union proposal below.
6. The "Eurodollar" Market
The global role played by the dollar, as described in Part II, gave
nearly immediate rise to a global dollar-denominated asset and liabil-
ity known as the "Eurodollar" bank deposit. 37' The nature and signifi-
cance of Eurodollars and, now, other "Eurocurrencies" is best
conveyed simply by briefly narrating the tale of their development.
Immediately following the Second World War, American policy
was to get dollars quickly into the hands of Europeans for two rea-
sons. 372 First, dollars helped Europe to rebuild after the War as
quickly as possible, rendering Soviet communism less attractive than
367. Scoi-r, supra note 325, at 407.
368. Id. at 406-08.
369. Id. at 407-08.
370. Id. at 408.
371. See id. at 500-29, (detailing matters covered in the next several paragraphs).
372. For more information on these historical events, see generally Macro to Micro,
supra note 3, at 165-74.
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it was then feared it might become.373 Second, flooding Europe with
dollars developed another deep market for American manufactures, as
overcapacity loomed as a significant problem as the United States
wound-down production after the War. The United States employed
two means to achieve this goal. One was to make large cash grants of
foreign aid, through programs like the Marshall Plan. Another was to
encourage massive importation of European products, in order to en-
able struggling European nations to earn foreign exchange with which
to pay off war debts.
374
The massing of European dollar holdings over the course of the
1950s resulted in London banks accepting deposits and offering loans
denominated in dollars. 375 Increasingly, Europeans could deposit dol-
lars into British banks and retain dollar denomination of those depos-
its. 376 By the same token, British banks began lending dollars directly
on the strength of those deposits. 377 The resulting "Eurodollar" mar-
ket, as it came to be called, soon offered certain advantages even to
Americans that American bank deposits could not boast.378 For one
thing, the banks that offered these services were not under American
jurisdiction, which rendered them attractive to persons operating out
of countries with which the United States did not enjoy warm rela-
tions-e.g., the Soviet Union in the later 1950s.379 For another thing,
and more generally, banks offering Eurodollar products were not sub-
ject to U.S. banking regulations such as interest rate ceilings and re-
serve requirements.380 That meant that these banks could do more-
and more risky-lending than their American counterparts, and that
they could afford to offer depositors higher returns in consequence.
38
1
In time, banks generalized the Eurodollar idea. It is now common
for banks in one jurisdiction to offer deposits and loans denominated
in currencies issued by other jurisdictions. 382 There are now, for ex-
ample, "Euroyen" deposited in and lent by British banks, and indeed
"Euroeuro" deposited in and lent by Japanese banks.383 "Eurocur-
rency," in other words, no longer connotes anything necessarily Euro-
373. See id. at 169.
374. Id. at 169-70.
375. See id. at 170.
376. See id.
377. See id.
378. See id. at 170 n.60.
379. See id.
380. See Scorr, supra note 325, at 500.
381. See id.
382. See id. at 406.
383. See id. at 501.
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pean other than the history of this particular form of depositor asset or
bank liability. It simply refers to the taking of deposits or extension of
credit denominated in one currency by a bank operating within a juris-
diction that issues a different currency. 384 Nevertheless, Eurodollars
are by far the largest source of global finance in cross-border transac-
tions today. 385 And this represents another obstacle to the Fed's main-
taining control over the U.S. money supply and the relative value of
the dollar. This fact, too, will inform the Clearing Union design of-
fered below.
7. Offshore Financial Centers
In a recent development that one-ups (or one-downs) the
Eurocurrency markets, a number of small political units have offered
their jurisdictions up as low-tax, low-regulation sites where financial
firms can do business. 38 6 Originally serving as "tax havens," these ju-
risdictions, most located around the Caribbean or among the British
Channel Islands, 387 have in effect become "law havens" more gener-
ally. During the first decade of the new millennium, many familiar
financial firms began locating subsidiaries offshore to conceal finan-
cial activities that they wished to shield from domestic regulatory
scrutiny.
Some believe that, as our most recent bubbles inflated, major fi-
nancial institutions concealed many of their worst practices that dan-
gerously increased their risk exposures by moving them offshore.388
Others note the prevalence of money-laundering on the part of organ-
ized crime and terrorist organizations at these centers. 389 As such,
these centers represent gaping holes in our system of global financial
384. See id. at 500.
385. See Macro to Micro, supra note 3, at 170 (discussing the development of
Eurodollars).
386. See generally RONEN PALAN ET AL., TAX HAVENS: How GLOBALIZATION RE-
ALLY WORKS (2010).
387. See generally id. For additional analysis, see RONEN PALAN, THE OmFSHORE
WORLD: SOVEREIGN MARKETS, VIRTUAl+ PLACES, ANi) NOMAD MILLIONAIRES 49-50
(2003).
388. See, e.g., Nicholas Sarkozy, President of France, Address at the Sixteenth Con-
ference of Ambassadors (Aug. 27, 2008) (decrying investors who use offshore invest-
ment to conceal risks, among other practices).
389. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Changing the Rules of the Game: Offshore Finan-
cial Centers, Regulatory Competition, & Financial Crises 7, 11 (Ill. Law & Econ.
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. LE09-03 l, 2009) (describing the compli-
cated relationship between offshore confidentiality, money laundering, and legitimate
interests), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1501402.
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regulation. 390 Although always important in their own right, robust
global regulations will be essential for the operation of the Clearing
Union. Accordingly, I shall recommend that these places simply be
shut down-by robust use of force if need be. Happily, however, the
G20 already appears to be on the case. Hence what I shall propose is
not apt to be controversial in serious company.
8. The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication (SWIFT)
Over the course of the 1970s, the Society for Worldwide In-
terbank Financial Telecommunication, or "SWIFT," a multiple bank-
owned co-op based near Brussels under Belgian company law, estab-
lished a telecommunications network and set of protocols to facilitate
rapid and efficient transacting between banks worldwide. 39' The pro-
tocols include codes for particular transaction types, routinized operat-
ing procedures, liability rules, and the like.392 These have become
sufficiently respected across the world that SWIFT is now sanctioned
by the United Nations as standard-setting authority for the promulga-
tion and maintenance of global financial messaging protocols. 393
Since the 1970s, an ever-growing majority of cross-border in-
terbank communications has been routed through the SWIFT net-
work.394 Banks do not transfer funds or settle accounts via SWIFT,
but they do communicate payment orders. 395 Banks then make pay-
ments via separate correspondent accounts that they maintain with one
another.396 The volume of transactions conducted in part via SWIFT
has grown very large over the years. 397 As more and more transactions
are arranged via the network, the prospects for tracking transnational
money flows systematically grow too. That renders the prospects of
global monetary and financial regulation more bright as well-though
390. See, e.g., Alfred Schipke, Offshore Financial Centers: Finding the Right Bal-
ance, IFC RiwIrW (Jan 2, 2013), http://www.ifcreview.com/restricted.aspx?articleld=
5673 (describing the regulatory challenges offshore financial centers pose to the
global economy).
391. SWIFT History, SWIFT, http://www.swift.com/about swift/company-informa
tion/swifthistory.page?lang=en (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
392. SWIFT for Retail Payment Market Infrastructures, SWIFT, http://www.swift.
com/products-services/by-customer/banking-mkt infr/lowvaluepaym-mi (last vis-
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this is not without controversy. I shall exploit this infrastructure as
well in the updated Clearing Union proposal sketched below.
9. Wire Transfer and Automated Clearing House Systems
While SWIFT constitutes a uniform communications network
used by banks worldwide to communicate payment orders, the sys-
tems by which banks make payments vary from nation to nation. 398 In
the United States, the principle wire transfer networks are the Federal
Reserve Wire Network, or "Fedwire," and the Clearing House In-
terbank Payments System, or "CHIPS. '399 The former is owned and
operated by the Federal Reserve System itself, which in turn is partly
owned by its member banks.4°° The latter is owned by its participating
banks, rather like SWIFT. 40 1 Other nations have their counterparts to
Fedwire and CHIPS-for example, CHAPS in the United Kingdom
and CHATS in Hong Kong.
402
Nations' payment systems also typically include automated clear-
ing house systems that facilitate direct, electronic deposits of payroll
moneys or business-to-business payments into bank accounts held by
payment recipients. 403 The two principal such systems in the United
States are the network known simply as "ACH," governed by the Fed
and the National Automated Clearing House Association (NACHA),
and the privately owned network known as the Electronic Payments
Network (EPN).404 In effect, these networks relate counterparties and
their banks to one another rather as SWIFT relates banks across bor-
ders to one another, with wire transfer networks then effecting actual
transfers of funds between banks.
398. See ScoTT, supra note 325, at 418-55 (detailing matters covered in the next
several paragraphs).
399. Id. at 418-19.
400. Id. at 423.
401. Id. at 426.
402. Acronyms for "Clearing House Automated Payment System" and "Clearing
House Automated Transfer System," respectively. About CHAPS, CLEARING HOUSE
AUTOMATED PAYMENT Sys., http://www.chapsco.co.uk/about-chaps/ (last visited Oct.
28, 2012).
403. See, e.g., What is Automated Clearing House (ACH)?, AUTOMATED CLEARING
HOUSE, http://www.achq.com/resources/what-is-ach.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2012).
404. See id.; Intro to the ACH Network, NAT'i AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE
ASS'N, http://www.nacha.org/c/Intro2ACH.cfm (last visited Oct. 28, 2012); About
EPN: Overview, THE CLEARING HousiF, http://www.epaynetwork.comlcms/about/
001453.php (last visited Oct. 18, 2012).
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B. A New Clearing Union Plan
Given the global financial architecture just described, design and
implementation of a Keynesian clearing union suitable to the present
day is not a terribly complicated affair. I will map the most straight-
forward route by enumerated reference to the constitutive elements of
the architecture described in the previous Subpart.
1. Employ-and Merge-the BIS and the IMF, and Fully Monetize
the SDR
Recall first that the Keynesian Clearing Union described in Part I
was itself a bank. It was a central bank to the central banks, in that
each nation's central bank maintained an account with the Clearing
Union just as private banks within nations typically maintain accounts
with their central banks. Now as it happens, the BIS already plays
such a role, in part. As noted in the previous Subpart, central banks
already keep accounts at the BIS. The BIS differs from a Keynesian
Clearing Union in two respects. First, the BIS does not issue global
currency or credit. Second, the BIS does not keep global trade ac-
counts in long-term balance through a rules-based system of currency
reevaluation.
Note, however, that those two features are present, in a rudimen-
tary way, in the IMF, which Keynes played a part in designing. The
IMF currently does issue a global proto-currency-the SDR-and
does issue, to a modest degree, global credit as a means of maintaining
global liquidity. Moreover, the IMF oversees an orderly, if not alto-
gether regular, regime of occasional currency revaluation.
What this all adds up to is the fact that the BIS and the IMF
together, between them, possess in rudimentary form all of the essen-
tial features that Keynes's Clearing Union plan possessed. What is
more, both employ the SDR as a monetary unit of account. What we
should consider, then, is first to merge the two institutions-calling
the resultant institution something like "the Global Clearing Union"
(GCU) in honor of Keynes. Then, we must incrementally but steadily
augment the functions housed in the new entity. We can do the latter
as follows.
First, we use the G20 mechanism to require all cross-border
transactions to be cleared by crediting and debiting BIS accounts held
by national central banks, just as Keynes proposed. These BIS ac-
counts will of course now be held by the GCU.
Second, we agree that currencies shall be regularly revalued
when nations run persistent deficits or surpluses, again along the origi-
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nal Keynesian lines. Unlike the IMF's current sporadic reevaluations,
the GCU's adjustment mechanism will operate "automatically," ac-
cording to a formula. The system, in other words, will be "rule-based"
and accordingly predictable. That, we shall see, shall remove a consid-
erable source of uncertainty and volatility in global financial markets,
and will also render much that is currently done in the global foreign
exchange market unnecessary.
Finally, we agree that the SDR-perhaps renamed simply the
"DR" since it will no longer be "special," or even the "bancor" in
honor of Keynes-will continue as the unit of account employed by
the GCU. Further, we agree that the SDR is to be fully monetized-
again along Keynesian lines. Our new Global Clearing Union institu-
tion will thus issue global credit-money just as Keynes's would have
done, and will do so in sufficient quantity as to render massive U.S.
trade deficits no longer necessary as the principal source of global
liquidity. The SDR will accordingly become the international reserve
currency, enabling us at long last to take ourselves off of the horns of
the "Triffin dilemma."
Governance matters within the new GCU will of course be criti-
cally important and potentially controversial. The GCU will discharge
the politically charged credit- and finance-modulatory functions of a
global central bank. But this should not cause us all that much worry
because both the BIS and the IMF already are governed by the central
bank chiefs and finance ministers of the nations that constitute them.
They are not, in other words, independent of the nations on whose
behalves they operate as instrumentalities. The Global Clearing Union
would not be either.
Moreover, the G20-which is itself constituted by national cen-
tral banking and finance ministerial authorities-will presumably
continue to oversee global financial and economic matters at large as
it does now. It will, that is to say, constitute the "Board" to the GCU's
"officers," considered jointly, just as it currently does to the BIS and
IMF considered severally.
Another remaining question would be what to do about the re-
search arms of the BIS and IMF, whose respective functions overlap
but also diverge. I have no particular wisdom to offer in response to
this question, other than to say that not all that much would seem to
hinge upon what answer we ultimately settle upon. As a default, I
would suggest simply keeping the distinct research departments as we
currently find them, simply calling one such set the "Washington" of-
fices, and the other such set the "Basel" offices, referring to their pre-
sent locations. In time we might expect fuller merging, but as it
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happens there is considerable back-and-forth among personnel al-
ready, so no particularly radical change would seem to be necessary or
in the offing here.
2. Continue to Employ SWIFT and the Current Wire Transfer and
Automatic Clearing Systems
SWIFT and the current wire transfer and automatic clearing sys-
tems described above can continue to operate as they currently operate
because they will not cause any friction between the GCU and lower
layers of the economy. Movements of funds between individuals,
firms, and their banks within and across nations, in other words,
should be able to continue to be directed through the mixed private-
public communications infrastructures that we already have.
Presumably some change will come to the current infrastructure
due to processes already in motion. But such will remain independent
of the GCU. We might also find it convenient to employ SWIFT in
communicating payment orders among national banks to the new
GCU, but nothing critical hinges on doing so. In sum, then, our new
institution need not conflict with, and might well even employ, the
current interbank communications and clearing architecture. Matters
are different, however, in respect of three other components of the
current institutional infrastructure, to which I now turn.
3. Phase-Out the Foreign Exchange and Eurodollar Markets, and
Shut Down the OFCs
While the existing communications and clearing architecture are
compatible with the GCU, matters are somewhat different where the
foreign exchange and Eurocurrency markets, as well as the unregu-
lated offshore financial centers are concerned. All three of the latter, I
believe, should be phased-out or shut down.
The foreign exchange and Eurocurrency markets will no longer
be needed once the new GCU is fully instituted. In the case of the
foreign exchange market, there will no longer be any need to trade
currencies; cross-border transactions will clear at the GCU through the
account-crediting and -debiting mechanism. In the case of the
Eurocurrency market, banks will no longer have a legitimate need for
significant holdings of foreign currencies once the SDR becomes the
global reserve currency. Nor, relatedly, will there be any legitimate
need to hold large quantities of foreign currencies as hedges against
possible changes in other currencies' relative values.
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Once the new Clearing Union is operating, the only reasons that
people would have for holding foreign currencies or using offshore
financial centers would be illegitimate ones. They would be, in other
words, either to speculate in a manner that no longer would be neces-
sary to afford liquidity-since the GCU itself will supply that-or to
evade domestic regulations and criminal statutes. Those are per se ille-
gitimate aims. Their only effects on the global financial system are
non-salutary-indeed destabilizing. Shut them down.
It might be objected that foreign currencies have become useful
hedging assets, and that closing the foreign exchange markets would
accordingly deny financial market participants a valuable form of in-
surance. But this simply is not so. Insofar as people have legitimate
needs to hedge against changes in relative currency valuations, they
can always engage in derivative transactions.
Moreover, because changes in relative currency valuations are
now to be effected in an altogether foreseeable and predictable fash-
ion, pursuant to a straightforward rule-based, account-balance-main-
taining formula, there seems little need to hedge in this particular
manner anyway. One hedges against volatility, while speculative
hedging itself often causes or augments volatility in the ways de-
scribed above in Part I. The very point of the GCU, of course, is pre-
cisely to bring an end to monetary and financial volatility of these
sorts. And a transparent rule-based revaluation formula does just that.
It might also be worth noting that closing these markets will not
affect many people other than those with non-cognizable interests. For
the only such people would seem to be the foreign exchange brokers
themselves, many of whom are circumvented in any event by direct
bank-to-bank currency transacting. These people and their skills
would seem easily marketable in continuing markets calling upon sim-
ilar skills, in particular the still growing-though happily soon to be
better regulated-global derivatives markets.
CONCLUSION
We have covered a great deal of ground here and yet more re-
mains to be said. In particular, questions concerning the appropriate
sequencing of the institutional proposals I have made must be ad-
dressed. So must questions concerning the formulae pursuant to which
national currencies are to be revalued or devalued within the com-
bined BIS/IMF Clearing Union institution. Finally, a host of prospec-
tive objections to what I have here proposed must be acknowledged or
anticipated, and then appropriately addressed. I trust, however, that
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enough has been done in the present article to justify deferral of re-
maining questions to the next installment.
What we have established here, I hope, is the following. First,
that domestic financial and monetary, hence full employment
macroeconomic stability, require that a central bank modulate its na-
tional economy's credit-money cycle-a cycle that is otherwise vul-
nerable to self-augmenting "feedback" loops rooted in recursive
collective action problems. Second, that persistent transnational trade
imbalances of substantial magnitude render this critical domestic cen-
tral bank role decidedly difficult, when not altogether impossible, to
fulfill. And finally third, that a straightforward variation on J.M.
Keynes's original International Clearing Union plan for what became
the IMF will be well suited to putting an end to those persistent imbal-
ances, and can do so in a manner that makes optimal use of the greater
part of the global financial architecture we currently have. Such were
the arguments of Parts I through III, respectively.
Let that suffice for the present. And let the process of detailed
planning and argument begin.
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